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5 
Issues and Conclusions 
Fundamental Attitudes of the Russian Political Elite: 
Law, Truth, Public Welfare and Violence 
Russia’s behaviour towards Ukraine surprised most 
Western observers. Its annexation of the Crimea and 
destabilisation of the Donbas region indicate – along 
with other actions and statements since early 2014 – 
that certain assumptions underpin Russia’s foreign 
(and domestic) politics. These assumptions in turn 
seem to be the expression of a specific political culture 
among the Russian elite and are based on attitudes 
that differ substantially from those of decision-makers 
in many Western countries. The aim of this study is to 
expose these assumptions and point out their poten-
tial consequences for relations between Russia and the 
EU (and its member states). 
The renowned Russian economist Vladislav Inozem-
tsev believes that anyone attempting to understand 
the actions of Russian decision-makers “must forget 
about traditional norms and logic as they exist in 
democratic nations”. His remark does not exclusively 
refer to the differences between today’s democratic 
and authoritarian regimes, but also to the repercus-
sions of the historical experiences that have shaped 
Russia, both as a feudal realm and (in the form of the 
USSR) as a socialist state and superpower during the 
Cold War. It implies that any attempt to project one’s 
own attitudes directly onto the other can be especially 
misleading with regard to Russia. We therefore need 
to scrutinise several fundamental assumptions made 
by the Russian elite that play a role in political deci-
sions in both domestic and foreign policy. This analy-
sis will also be helpful in understanding the nexus 
between these two policy areas. 
To examine these attitudes, the study will focus 
on the following four social and political dimensions: 
the significance of the law and legislation; the way 
in which truth and history are used; the manner in 
which the national interest and questions of public 
welfare are interpreted; and the attitude towards 
(physical) violence. It considers these spheres to be 
decisive components of the elite’s political culture in 
Russia, meaning that the elite’s stance on these areas 
will influence its decisions in the years to come. A 
better insight into these intellectual attitudes will 
therefore be useful to more realistically define the 
spectrum of Russia’s potential actions and better 
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6 
anticipate probable Russian reactions to approaches 
by Western states. 
The study concludes that the Russian elite has a 
strong tendency to instrumentalise the above-men-
tioned areas to pursue its foreign and domestic politi-
cal interests. It sees violence as a useful means to ex-
tend Russia’s international influence and shore up the 
power of the ruling regime, even at substantial cost 
to human life. Truths are manipulated and created 
so as to legitimise Russia’s position vis-à-vis external 
actors and its domestic audience. The elite recognises 
the usefulness of the law when it helps to control 
the population and ensure that international actors 
remain predictable. However, whenever it is deemed 
necessary, individual decisions by the elite’s top 
representatives can override legally binding obliga-
tions. Finally, the welfare of the Russian people is 
defined from the perspective of the elite’s own inter-
ests, without citizens being consulted, let alone 
included in decisionmaking. The elite’s willingness 
to instrumentalise the above-mentioned spheres 
indicates that it is hardly ideologised. In turn, this 
suggests that the elements of a supposedly emerging 
regime ideology (traditional values, role of the 
Church, etc.) are purely functional in nature. 
Many Western nations are now contemplating a 
Russia policy that extends beyond the current crisis 
and will be relevant for the upcoming years. Such a 
policy should be based on substantiated assumptions 
concerning the behaviour of the Russian elite. These 
assumptions in turn should be derived from knowl-
edge of the elite’s fundamental attitudes to political 
and moral categories such as law, truth, public wel-
fare and violence. Whether or not a new political 
approach to Russia (and the entire post-Soviet region) 
is successful will depend in part on correctly inter-
preting the prevalent attitudes within Moscow’s ap-
paratus of power, and their implications for Russia’s 
behaviour. It is therefore essential to analyse these 
attitudes more closely – even though we cannot read 
the relevant individuals’ minds. 
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Terminology and Methodology: 
Political Culture, Elite and Attitudes* 
 
The fact that Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria 
generated widespread surprise suggests that new 
efforts are needed to try to understand the Russian 
elite’s behaviour and perhaps even roughly anticipate 
it. One strategy is to imagine situations that might 
trigger certain actions by Russia.1 Another is to ana-
lyse fundamental attitudes of the Russian elite that 
influence its decisions. Working through hypothetical 
situations certainly helps to visualise more specifically 
the repertoire of possible actions. However, by defini-
tion, these actions concern only the fictitious event 
that has been imagined in a given case. By contrast, 
any analysis of attitudes must remain inexact, but in 
return it can be applied to any number of modelled 
situations. Moreover, the conclusions drawn from 
such an analysis can be of lasting use since the politi-
cal cultures of elites (like those of societies) change 
very slowly. 
It is precisely this relative permanence which 
ensures that the term “political culture” is appropri-
ate when describing the Russian elite’s formative 
patterns of thought and action. The purpose of this 
study is most closely suited to the following defini-
tion: Political culture is the “set of attitudes, beliefs 
and sentiments that give order and meaning to a 
political process and which provide the underlying 
assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the 
political system”.2 In other words, it concerns the 
attitudes underpinning and influencing the decisions 
made by political actors, even if these attitudes do not 
determine their decisions completely or in absolutely 
every case. For “political culture is neither static nor 
deterministic, nor does it offer historical laws for 
today or the future. But the concept of political cul-
ture assumes that in every society there are character-
istics, modes of behaviour and institutions that are 
extraordinarily persistent and reproduce themselves 
 
* I am grateful to Julia Ostanina for her help with the 
research for this study. 
1 An example of this method is Conceivable Surprises. Eleven 
Possible Turns in Russia’s Foreign Policy, ed. Sabine Fischer and 
Margarete Klein, SWP Research Paper 10/2016 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2016). 
2 Lucian W. Pye, “Political Culture”, in International Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 12 (New York, 1968), 218. 
even in and beyond revolutions, and that, in any case, 
they change at a slower rate than many processes of 
modernisation, such as industrialisation, urbanisation 
or the massive expansion of education.”3 
As a rule, the concept of political culture is applied 
to societies, as the above quotation implies.4 However, 
studies of the political culture of elites do exist; in-
deed, these approaches go back almost as far as the 
original discussion of political culture at a societal 
level.5 Some are comparative, and the Russian/Soviet 
case has already been the subject of such analyses.6 
However, they are less numerous than studies of the 
political culture of societies. This is partly due to 
the associated methodological difficulties.7 
In order to lay bare the attitudes of the Russian elite 
and catalogue any changes, this study is centred on 
four spheres. They are, as it were, the testing grounds 
for systematically analysing the statements and actions 
 
3 Gerhard Simon, “Zukunft aus der Vergangenheit: Elemente 
der politischen Kultur in Rußland”, Berichte des BIOst 10-1995 
(Cologne: Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und inter-
nationale Studien [BIOst], 1995), http://nbn-resolving.de/urn: 
nbn:de:0168-ssoar-41734 (accessed 6 March 2017). See also 
Boris Dubin, “Simulierte Macht und zeremonielle Politik: Ele-
mente der politischen Kultur in Russland”, Osteuropa 3 (2006): 
19–32. 
4 The seminal work is Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, 
The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations 
(Princeton, 1963). 
5 See Ruth Lane, “Political Culture: Residual Category or 
General Theory?”, Comparative Political Studies 25, no. 3 (Octo-
ber 1992): 362–87. 
6 See e.g. Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Con-
flict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven, 1973); John 
S. Duffield, “Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Ger-
many Confounds Neorealism”, International Organization 53, 
no. 4 (September 1999): 765–803; Michael Urban, Cultures of 
Power in Post-Communist Russia. An Analysis of Elite Political Dis-
course (New York, 2010). 
7 The authors I cite were usually able to conduct interviews 
with relevant members of the elite. But in today’s context of 
tense relations between Russia and the West, this is hardly 
possible. Even Russian observers find that the attitudes of the 
current Russian elite can only be studied indirectly because 
that sphere is increasingly closed: Denis Volkov, “Russian 
Elite Opinion after Crimea” (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Cen-
ter, March 2016), 6, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_ 
Volkov_WEB_Eng.pdf (accessed 6 March 2017). 
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8 
of Russian decision-makers. The study’s initial focus is 
on developments since 2014, but it also examines each 
sphere for the period before 2014 so as to assess the 
degree of continuity in Russian attitudes. Finally, it 
discusses the potential consequences of the attitudes 
that have been identified for the future behaviour 
of the Russian leadership and German-Russian or EU-
Russia relations. Its starting-point is therefore the 
thesis that, by analysing past actions and statements, 
we can discover patterns that reveal fundamental 
attitudes of at least part of the elite. These attitudes 
in turn offer important indications as to the range of 
possible future decisions and modes of behaviour by 
top echelons of the Russian elite. 
However, it should be taken into account that the 
Russian elite is not monolithic. Rather, it consists of 
different groups and is dynamic in nature. This means 
that members of the elite can be excluded or can 
change their position (of power) within the constella-
tion of the elite. However, the study’s purpose is not to 
sound out relations within the elite or analyse latent 
tendencies to splinter. Its focus is limited to the elite’s 
top echelons in politics.8 This encompasses above all 
the president, prime minister and cabinet (including 
deputies), leading representatives of the president’s 
administration, and the chairs of important authori-
ties and federal committees. The study also analyses 
statements made by representatives of this circle. How-
ever, because such utterances often run counter to the 
actual actions, it pays more attention to the latter in 
inferring principal attitudes. Since Russian decision-
making processes are largely non-transparent, actions 
may suggest a higher level of consensus among atti-
tudes than actually exists. The risk of distortion is 
reduced, however, by the study’s focus on four dif-
ferent spheres: wherever there is extensive coherence 
in attitudes across different areas, it suggests that 
these attitudes are both durable and acted upon. 
As mentioned above, I have chosen four spheres 
to examine: 
 the significance of law and legislation; 
 the use to which truth and history are put; 
 the way in which the national interest and public 
welfare are interpreted; 
 the relationship with physical violence. 
 
8 Wherever relevant, this also encompasses the top echelons 
of the security sector and economic policy-makers. On the 
heterogeneity of the elite, see e.g. Benno Ennker, “Putin und 
seine Freunde. Die Elite und die Bruchstellen der Macht”, Ost-
europa 6–8 (2012): 125–44. 
These areas were chosen for several reasons. First, 
it is the elite’s behaviour therein that has shaped 
Russia’s foreign and domestic politics since 2014 and 
frequently astonished the West. Second, these four 
spheres of thought and action are also well-suited to 
an analysis of the period before 2014, so as to evaluate 
continuities or changes in the attitudes of the Russian 
elite.9 Third, the patterns of thought that can be iden-
tified in these areas are sufficiently fundamental to 
play an important role in future decisions. Fourth, the 
resulting insights into the Russian leadership can 
provide indications for the way German-Russian (and 
EU-Russia) relations might develop. Even if the chosen 
spheres are not necessarily the only ones that fulfil 
these criteria, an understanding of the elite’s attitudes 
in these four areas can make an important contribu-
tion to interpreting Russian behaviour. 
The Russian elite increasingly acts within an authori-
tarian context that shapes its room for manoeuvre and 
patterns of behaviour. These conditions must be taken 
into consideration because they can explain, at least 
in part, the actions described below and the attitudes 
that can be inferred from them. This certainly includes 
an ever-growing personalisation of power.10 And yet it 
would be short-sighted to ascribe the actions of the 
Russian elite exclusively to the form of political regime. 
Rather, historical, sociological and cultural factors 
also substantially contribute to them. These interact 
with the political system to form a complex edifice 
that creates path dependencies and limits decisions 
and modes of thinking. The study does not claim to 
model this edifice. Rather, it aims to reveal patterns 
of action and identify the attitudes that fit these 
patterns. 
 
 
 
9 The study mainly examines the period of 2008 to 2014. In a 
few cases, events that occurred before 2008 are also included. 
10 See especially Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: 
Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, D.C., 2013), but also 
Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir 
Putin (New York, 2016). 
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Approaches to Law and Legislation 
 
One of the greatest surprises for political observers in 
many parts of the West has been Moscow’s readiness, 
which has been unmistakable since Russia’s annexa-
tion of the Crimea and its military intervention in 
the Donbas, to repeatedly disregard international law. 
This ruthlessness is in blatant contrast to Russia’s ear-
lier rhetorical stance of championing the fundamen-
tal precepts of international law (especially under the 
umbrella of the United Nations), in particular the idea 
of state sovereignty. The shift raises the question as to 
what the Russian elite’s current attitude is to inter-
national law in particular and binding legal agree-
ments and the concept of law in general. The answer 
will also reflect the status of the law within the Rus-
sian Federation, since the extent of the elite’s willing-
ness to meet its legal obligations manifests itself not 
only in foreign policy, but also in domestic politics. It 
will therefore be interesting to examine similarities 
and differences in attitudes to the law in the foreign 
and domestic policy realms. 
International Law 
The fact that the Russian Federation breached inter-
national law through its military occupation and 
subsequent annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 
spring 2014 is already well-documented and, accord-
ing to widely accepted legal criteria, beyond dispute.11 
Commentators frequently point out that Russia’s 
annexation violates fundamental documents of inter-
national law (the United Nations Charter, Paris Char-
ter and Helsinki Act) which guarantee the territorial 
integrity of existing states. In the case of Ukraine, 
there are further specific texts, such as the Budapest 
Memorandum, in which Russia, the UK and the US 
committed to “respect[ing] the independence and 
 
11 See e.g. Thomas D. Grant, “Annexation of Crimea”, Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 109, no. 1 (January 2015): 68–95; 
Robin Geiß, “Russia’s Annexation of Crimea: The Mills of 
International Law Grind Slowly But They Do Grind”, Inter-
national Law Studies 91 (2015): 425–49, http://stockton.usnwc. 
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1377&context=ils (accessed 
6 March 2017). I am grateful to Christian Schaller for his 
advice on issues of international law. 
sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and 
to “refrain[ing] from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence 
of Ukraine”.12 Moreover, Russia has violated bilateral 
agreements with Ukraine, in particular the 1997 
Friendship Treaty. Not all of these agreements and 
conventions pertain to international law. It is striking, 
however, that the Russian leadership was willing to 
ignore bilateral and even multilateral obligations in 
the Crimean case – including international documents 
which are considered to be universally valid world-
wide.13 
Russia’s infringement of international law is not 
limited to its annexation of the Crimea, however, but 
also pertains to its actions in and concerning eastern 
Ukraine. While there has been no annexation, the sup-
port of Russia’s armed forces for local rebels – which 
has been verified by multiple sources – is also a vio-
lation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine.14 This support ranges from providing war 
material and ammunition in substantial quantities 
to training fighters in situ, to members of the Russian 
armed forces participating in battles, particularly in 
decisive ones such as in Ilovaisk or Debaltseve. These 
 
12 See “Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 
1994”, Council on Foreign Relations (online), 5 December 1994, 
http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-
disarmament/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-
1994/p32484 (accessed 6 March 2017). 
13 Nonetheless, some Russian scholars argue for an inter-
pretation of international law that justifies the annexation 
of the Crimea: see e.g. Anatoly Kapustin, “Crimea’s Self-Deter-
mination in the Light of Contemporary International Law”, 
Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 75, 
no. 1 (2015): 101–18. 
14 Putin. War. Based on Materials from Boris Nemtsov, ed. Ilya 
Yashin and Olga Shorina (Moscow, May 2015), http:// 
4freerussia.org/putin.war/Putin.War-Eng.pdf; Maksymilian 
Czuperski et al., Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine 
(Washington, D.C.: The Atlantic Council, May 2015), http:// 
www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_ 
Plain_Sight/HPS_English.pdf; James Miller et al., An Invasion 
by Any Other Name: The Kremlin’s Dirty War in Ukraine (New York: 
The Institute of Modern Russia/The Interpreter, 17 September 
2015), http://www.interpretermag.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/11/IMR_Ukraine_final_links_updt_02_corr.pdf (accessed 
6 March 2017). 
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actions by the Russian leadership demonstrate that it 
has broken international law not only by annexing the 
Crimea, but also in other instances. 
This behaviour is blatantly inconsistent not only 
with the rhetoric of the Russian political elite before 
the military intervention in Ukraine, but also with its 
declarations today. A firm part of this rhetoric in the 
years before 2014 was an emphasis on the importance 
of international law and in particular the United 
Nations. Interestingly, the Russian leadership still ad-
heres to this rhetoric despite breaches of international 
law that it has itself committed. At the annual meeting 
of the Valdai Club in October 2014, Putin said: “I will 
add that international relations must be based on 
international law, which itself should rest on moral 
principles such as justice, equality and truth”.15 One 
explanation for this continuity in statements is that 
the Russian leadership rejects many of the accusations 
and denies that it has breached international law. 
Whenever it does discuss the complaints of its inter-
national interlocutors, it points to allegedly compa-
rable breaches of international law, such as the bomb-
ing of the former Yugoslavia in 1999 after serious 
human-rights violations in Kosovo or the recognition 
of Kosovo’s independence by the US and many Euro-
pean states in 2008. This is an attempt by Russia to 
suggest that its behaviour does not differ substantially 
from that of other international actors, and that 
accusations of international-law violations must also 
be levelled against other states.16 
Did Moscow treat international law in this way 
before 2014? That is to say, was it characteristic of 
Russia even before its interventions in Ukraine to 
praise international law in word, but undermine and 
grossly violate its principles in deed? To answer this 
question, we must differentiate between types of obli-
 
15 Putin’s speech to the meeting of the Valdai International 
Discussion Club, 24 October 2014, http://kremlin.ru/events/ 
president/news/46860 (accessed 6 March 2017). 
16 While Western states have certainly violated international 
law in various instances, the lead-up to the international 
intervention in Kosovo was completely different from the 
Crimean case. Before NATO bombed Serbia, Kosovo had been 
in a state of civil war between the Serbian and Yugoslavian 
armed forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army for about a 
year, with hundreds of casualties and hundreds of thousands 
of refugees. See e.g. Christopher Greenwood, “Humanitarian 
Intervention: The Case of Kosovo”, Finnish Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law (Helsinki, 2002): 141–75; Christian Schaller, “Die 
Sezession des Kosovo und der völkerrechtliche Status der in-
ternationalen Präsenz”, Archiv des Völkerrechts 46, no. 2 (2008): 
131–71. 
gation in international relations, and specifically 
between contracts in the defence or energy sectors, 
and obligations relating to the post-Soviet area and 
internal Russian relations. 
Where defence and energy contracts are concerned, 
Russia has largely adhered to its agreements in the 
past few years. It has, however, increasingly distanced 
itself from armaments treaties, for instance by sus-
pending the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 
(CFE) in 2007 and the Plutonium Disposition and 
Management Agreement in 2016. Further examples 
are its alleged violations of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which regulates the dis-
armament and prohibition of intermediate-range 
weapons.17 These accusations have so far only been 
made by the US, which has also claimed that it cannot 
provide evidence without endangering its sources. If 
the accusations are substantiated, Moscow will have 
breached the treaty over a long period of time and to a 
serious degree, starting well before 2014. It is still too 
early, however, to draw this conclusion.18 
Contracts in the energy sector tend to be neither 
transparent nor public, unless they concern intergov-
ernmental agreements. Supply contracts are usually 
concluded between companies, whether state-owned 
or private. We therefore only have access to the other 
party’s statements to gauge Russia’s compliance in 
matters of energy contracts. In the vast majority of 
cases, these parties confirm that the Russian side acts 
in accordance with the contractual stipulations. For 
instance, in cases that have ended up before a court of 
arbitration, the Russian company Gazprom has either 
agreed to a compromise or accepted the court’s deci-
sion. These lawsuits primarily concern disagreements 
over the originally agreed price of natural gas. During 
the period when Russia, as a signatory, was considered 
a party to the energy-charter agreement, there were 
also doubts about the security of investments in the 
Russian Federation. A court found that the Russian 
government’s treatment of Yukos was in breach of 
 
17 Alexey Arbatov, The Ominous End of the Russia-U.S. Plutonium 
Agreement (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 17 October 2016), 
http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=64869; Oliver Meier, Die 
Krise des INF-Vertrages: Das Risiko eines nuklearen Wettrüstens in 
Europa wächst, SWP-Aktuell 11/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, February 2015), http://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
publikation/krise-des-inf-vertrages/ (both accessed 6 March 
2017). 
18 I am grateful to Oliver Meier for his evaluation of Russia’s 
behaviour in the defence sector. 
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contract.19 If we compare the way the then-largest oil 
company in the country was treated with the above-
mentioned compromises benefitting non-Russian 
businesses, it is hard not to conclude that Moscow 
handles domestic and foreign firms differently.20 The 
situation is slightly different where the energy agree-
ments concern Russia and other post-Soviet states. 
These contracts are even more lacking in transparency, 
and informal agreements play a greater role. Moreo-
ver, Moscow uses the price of natural gas in particular 
to reward or punish post-Soviet countries for their 
political stances. These states therefore enjoy far less 
contractual security, a situation for which not all the 
blame can be assigned to Russia.21 
Overall, problems concerning contract compliance 
are greater where the post-Soviet area is concerned. 
This is true not only for agreements between states of 
the post-Soviet area, but also for agreements between 
Russia and third states, either with other post-Soviet 
states or else relating to them. The most conspicuous 
proof of this is the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, and 
Moscow’s subsequent recognition of two regions of 
Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as independent 
states. Georgia had started the fighting, but Russia 
challenged Georgia’s territorial integrity by its mili-
tary intervention and its behaviour after the ceasefire. 
The situation was resolved with the help of the EU a 
few weeks after the conflict had started, when the 
then-French presidency of the European Council, rep-
resented by President Nicolas Sarkozy, negotiated a 
peace plan with Tbilisi and Moscow. Russia, however, 
did not adhere to the agreements formalised in the 
document, under which it had to withdraw behind a 
specific line and reduce its military presence in both 
areas.22 Instead, it has substantially expanded its 
 
19 However, this decision was later overturned by a Dutch 
court: Stanley Reed, “Dutch Court Overturns $50 Billion 
Ruling against Russia in Yukos Case”, The New York Times, 
20 April 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/business/ 
international/yukos-russia-50-billion-ruling.html (accessed 
6 March 2017). 
20 The EU’s cartel proceedings against Gazprom are not 
addressed by this study, for two reasons. First, the case is 
slightly different in that it concerns compatibility with the 
3rd EU internal market package. Second, the proceedings 
have not yet yielded any reliable results. 
21 I am grateful to Kirsten Westphal for her assessment of 
Russia’s behaviour in the energy sector. 
22 International Crisis Group, “Georgia-Russia: Learn to 
Live like Neighbours”, Europe Briefing no. 65 (Tbilisi et al., 
8 August 2011), 2, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/ 
b65-georgia-russia-learn-to-live-like-neighbours.pdf (accessed 
6 March 2017). 
presence and violated Georgia’s sovereignty by recog-
nising Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And since this 
non-compliance has had no negative consequences for 
Russia, the Russian leadership came to the conclusion 
that it could count on a similarly feeble European 
response to its annexation of the Crimea. 
The 2008 agreement between Russia and the Euro-
pean Union was reached because the EU wanted to put 
a rapid end to the war. It is noticeable, however, that 
there has been almost no other cooperation between 
Brussels and Moscow relating to the post-Soviet states 
in the EU neighbourhood. The EU would certainly 
have welcomed such an arrangement – it conceived 
the “Common Space of External Security” as just such 
a framework. However, this space has remained large-
ly empty in the years since. Germany also showed 
great interest in similar collaboration. For instance, 
the so-called Meseberg Initiative, agreed by Chancellor 
Merkel and the then-Russian President Medvedev in 
June 2010, was a German proposal. It was based on the 
idea that Russia would contribute constructively to 
resolving the situation in Transnistria,23 and in ex-
change a new dialogue format involving EU and Rus-
sian foreign ministers would be created. However, 
Moscow did not adequately fulfil its part of the bar-
gain, which is why Germany and the EU did not 
pursue the idea of the dialogue format. 
The Russian Federation also has major problems 
upholding international law in areas where its obli-
gations require changes in domestic policy or legis-
lation. An important example is Russia’s membership 
of the Council of Europe. By becoming a member, Mos-
cow committed itself to complying with the European 
Convention on Human Rights and respecting and im-
plementing the decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). However, Russia’s behaviour 
in the Parliamentary Assembly (PA) of the Council of 
Europe and in relation to the Court shows that it does 
not take these obligations seriously and is willing to 
fulfil them superficially at most. It uses the PA mainly 
to reject any criticism. On the whole, Russia does im-
plement the decisions of the ECtHR as far as paying 
compensation is concerned, but there have been no 
 
23 Transnistria is a secessionist region of the Republic of Mol-
dova, whose independence is mainly underwritten by Russian 
support: see e.g. Klemens Büscher, “The Transnistria Conflict 
in Light of the Crisis over Ukraine”, in Not Frozen! The Unresolved 
Conflicts over Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-
Karabakh in Light of the Crisis over Ukraine, ed. Sabine Fischer, 
SWP Research Paper 9/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, September 2016), 27–45. 
Approaches to Law and Legislation 
SWP Berlin 
Fundamental Attitudes of the Russian Political Elite 
June 2017 
 
 
 
12 
structural reforms of the Russian legal system. As a 
result, similar lawsuits are brought before the EHCR 
year after year, without Moscow addressing their 
causes.24 The Kremlin’s decision in December 2015 not 
to implement ECtHR decisions which do not conform 
to the Russian constitution emphasises the Russian 
leadership’s unwillingness to submit to an interna-
tional court.25 Statements on this subject by both 
Putin and the President of the Constitutional Court, 
Valery Zorkin, indicate a condescending attitude 
towards the Council of Europe and an ever-decreasing 
willingness to meet the associated obligations. 
Russia’s actions in the past, as much as its rhetoric 
of today, indicate that it was open to the idea of con-
cluding bilateral and multilateral treaties and agree-
ing to international rules, and in principle remains so. 
Its treatment of Ukraine has shown, however, that the 
Russian leadership is equally prepared to disregard 
and breach these agreements for reasons of supposedly 
overriding importance, if it seems opportune. This is 
evidence for an attitude that instrumentalises the law: 
respecting it can make sense, but it can just as easily 
be discarded if a different course suits Russia better. 
This approach correlates with the discourse on 
sovereignty that members of the Russian elite culti-
vate, positing that, as a sovereign actor, Russia is free 
to prioritise other parameters above international law. 
The Kremlin is more likely to reach this conclusion 
when relevant rules or agreements concern the post-
Soviet area or Russia’s internal situation. 
Law in the National Context 
The Russian elite’s estimation of the law and legisla-
tion carries over to the national context. This attitude 
is less directly linked to the crisis in and over Ukraine 
than is the case for international law, but how the law 
is treated on the national level is essential for under-
standing the basic attitude of the Russian elite in this 
domain. A good starting-point for this analysis is 2008, 
since it allows us to compare Dmitry Medvedev’s 
presidency with Putin’s third period in office, which 
 
24 Susan Stewart, Russland und der Europarat, SWP-Studie 
10/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2013). 
25 Ekaterina Mishina has shown that this was no spontaneous 
decision, but rather the expression of an attitude that has 
developed and consolidated over the years: Ekaterina Mishina, 
“The Kremlin’s Scorn for Strasbourg”, Institute of Modern Russia 
(online), 24 August 2015, http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/law/ 
2388-the-kremlins-scorn-for-strasburg (accessed 6 March 2017). 
followed. Medvedev made it his goal to fight “legal 
nihilism”, a buzzword that has since disappeared from 
the official discourse under Putin.26 Whether this in-
dicates that the two presidents represent different atti-
tudes to the law is a different question. This section 
will examine it, inter alia, by considering a) individual 
presidential actions (e.g. pardons), b) developments in 
civil rights and c) structural changes in the justice 
system. 
In an interview with The Financial Times in March 
2008, shortly after he was elected president of Russia, 
Medvedev referred several times to the significance of 
the law. He pointed to the importance of the Russian 
Constitution and the necessity of making it into “an 
act of direct action” i.e. directly applicable law. He also 
re-emphasised how crucial the separation of powers 
was and argued that “today we have to make all the 
necessary efforts to make sure that the courts in 
Russia are independent and objective and act on the 
basis of existing procedural legislation.”27 
Medvedev’s statements and his training as a lawyer 
raised expectations that the rule of law in Russia might 
improve. However, when the former Russian oligarch 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky was sentenced for the second 
time in December 2010, many observers came to the 
conclusion that the hopes invested in Medvedev were 
unfounded. Both the accusations and the trial itself 
utterly failed to meet the standards of rule-of-law pro-
ceedings.28 The verdict against Khodorkovsky sent a 
strongly negative signal concerning the relationship 
of the Russian leadership to the separation of powers 
and the independence of the judiciary. But even before 
 
26 Medvedev’s expression referred to the widespread disre-
gard or disdain for the law among the Russian people: see 
“Polnyi tekst vystypleniia Dmitriia Medvedeva na II Grazh-
danskom forume v Moskve 22 janvarja 2008 goda” [The 
complete text of Dmitry Medvedev’s speech to the 2nd Civic 
Forum in Moscow on 22 January 2008], Rossijskaja gazeta, 
24 January 2008, https://rg.ru/2008/01/24/tekst.html (accessed 
6 March 2017). 
27 “Interview Transcript: Dmitry Medvedev”, Financial Times, 
24 March 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f40629a8-f9ba-
11dc-9b7c-000077b07658.html#axzz4F7uy0aZ8 (accessed 22 
July 2016). 
28 Tom Parfitt, “Mikhail Khodorkovsky Sentenced to 14 
Years in Prison”, The Guardian, 30 December 2010, http://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/30/mikhail-khodorkovsky-
jail-term; International Bar Association, The Khodorkovsky Trial. 
A Report on the Observation of the Criminal Trial of Mikhail Boriso-
vich Khodorkovsky and Platon Leonidovich Lebedev, March 2009 to 
September 2010 (London, September 2011), http://www.ibanet. 
org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=1C47F688-ADCD-4D4B-AEA6-
5BF4039FF4D5 (accessed 6 March 2017). 
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the verdict, Medvedev’s behaviour had indicated that 
he did not always uphold the precepts of the rule of 
law which he had so strongly praised in his Financial 
Times interview. In May 2009 Medvedev put a change 
of legislation to the Duma, under which the president 
of the Constitutional Court and his or her deputy 
would henceforth be proposed by the Russian presi-
dent and appointed by parliament. These posts had 
previously been nominated by the judiciary. On 2 June 
2009, Medvedev signed a law to that effect, which had 
already been authorised by the Duma. 
Other spectacular legal cases of Medvedev’s presi-
dency show a rather conflicted picture. In late Novem-
ber 2009, the Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky died in 
custody because he had not received the necessary 
medical care in prison. Magnitsky had worked for 
the British-American businessman Bill Browder, who 
possessed information about a high-ranking corrup-
tion case which Magnitsky had been investigating. 
Medvedev ordered several prison officials to be dis-
missed and demanded a reduction in staff numbers 
at the interior ministry, which was involved in the 
scandal.29 The circumstances of Magnitsky’s death 
have never been fully clarified. The investigation into 
the murder of human-rights activist Natalya Estemi-
rova likewise petered out. After she was kidnapped 
and murdered in July 2009, Medvedev did quickly 
arrange for an investigation, but the investigators 
soon fixated on an abstruse theory and ignored other 
variants that would have incriminated high-ranking 
officials.30 
However, it is also worth looking at other areas of 
the law and comparing the way in which they were 
treated under Medvedev’s presidency and by Putin in 
his third term of office. Legal developments concern-
ing the media and involvement in demonstrations are 
particularly instructive because respect (or disregard) 
for these spheres of political participation provides 
clues about the willingness of the Russian leadership 
to act repressively and about the function of legisla-
tion in general. Medvedev’s well-known statement that 
“freedom is better than non-freedom” had raised hopes 
 
29 Amy Knight, “The End of the Medvedev Revolution?”, 
The New York Review of Books, 5 January 2011, http://www. 
nybooks.com/daily/2011/01/05/end-medvedev-revolution/ 
(accessed 6 March 2017). 
30 “Sidebar: The Unsolved Murder of Natalya Estemirova”, 
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) (online), 28 October 2014, 
https://cpj.org/reports/2014/10/the-road-to-justice-natalya-
estemirova-unsolved-murder.php (accessed 6 March 2017). 
at the beginning of his mandate that the Russian state 
would be tolerant of the media and demonstrators. 
On 6 November 2010, Medvedev used his veto against 
a draft law that proposed placing additional limits on 
the holding of demonstrations. For instance, organis-
ers would only have been allowed to make public the 
time and place of a demonstration once the rally had 
been approved by the authorities. Medvedev believed 
that the law “contains clauses that run counter to the 
free realisation of citizens’ constitutional right to hold 
assemblies, rallies, demonstrations and processions, 
and to picket”.31 After the December 2011 demonstra-
tions against fraud in the Duma election results, Med-
vedev responded to the demonstrators’ demands by re-
introducing elections for regional governors and ini-
tiating draft legislation that made it easier for politi-
cal parties to register for and participate in elections. 
These decisions point to a certain level of respect for 
demonstrations as an instrument and for participants, 
which is in keeping with his above-quoted comments 
on constitutional law. However, the law on guberna-
torial elections in particular was seen as a half-hearted 
measure because the executive continues to have the 
prerogative to intervene in the election process.32 
As regards the media, Medvedev set his own ac-
cents; however, this did little to loosen pre-existing 
restrictions. Camille Jackson from the University of 
Oxford concludes that Medvedev largely kept the 
restrictive political line on the media that Putin had 
established in his two terms in office, except for push-
ing through tougher penalties for violence against 
journalists and better protection of children from 
dangerous media content.33 The well-known commen-
tator on Russian politics, Maria Lipman, summarises 
as follows: under Medvedev, the media operated in an 
 
31 Vladimir Kus’min, “Veto vlasti” [The veto of power], 
Rossijskaja gazeta, 8 November 2010, https://rg.ru/2010/11/08/ 
medvedev.html (accessed 6 March 2017). 
32 “Russia Returns to Direct Election of Governors”, Russia 
Beyond the Headlines (online), 2 May 2012, http://rbth.com/ 
articles/2012/05/02/russia_has_the_direct_gubernatorial_ 
elections_returned_15558.html; J. Paul Goode, “The Revival of 
Russia’s Gubernatorial Elections: Liberalization or Potemkin 
Reform?”, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 139 (18 November 2013): 
9–11, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-
interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD-139-9-
11.pdf (both accessed 6 March 2017). Since 2013 Russia’s 
regions have been free to choose whether to hold elections 
for governor, or accept the candidate proposed by the presi-
dent. 
33 Camille Jackson, “Legislation as an Indicator of Free Press 
in Russia”, Problems of Post-Communism 63, no. 5–6 (1 July 2016): 
354–66. 
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overall climate of increased freedom and were able to 
address even sensitive topics to a certain extent. More-
over, as Lipman points out, a number of new media 
outlets were created, which primarily attracted young 
liberal customers. Overall, however, she found that 
the Russian media – and especially their ownership 
structures and the loyalty of their most important 
barons to Putin – remained unchanged.34 
During Putin’s third term in office, beginning in 
May 2012, the discourse on legal nihilism evaporated, 
as did the impression that some parts of society were 
becoming less fettered. A series of repressive laws 
replaced the relatively liberal approach, more strictly 
regulating demonstrations, the media and the Inter-
net.35 Other areas, such as legislation on non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs) or the rights of gays 
and lesbians, were also subject to this trend.36 In all 
of these sectors, public space was restricted, and the 
opportunities for articulating dissenting opinions or 
criticism of the regime – or for simply being different 
– were curtailed. The “Yarovaya Law” – named after 
the Duma member Irina Yarovaya (United Russia) who 
proposed it – was especially criticised in and outside 
of Russia. The law extended the reach of secret-service 
surveillance by imposing new and virtually ruinous 
conditions on telecommunications companies; by 
severely limiting the freedoms of religious groups; and 
by making it possible to punish people for not inform-
ing the authorities of others’ intention to commit a 
crime.37 Some observers believe that this legislation 
 
34 Maria Lipman, “Russia’s Non-Governmental Media under 
Assault”, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratiza-
tion 22, no. 2 (2014): 179–90. 
35 Gleb Bryanski, “Russia’s Putin Signs Anti-protest Law 
before Rally”, Reuters, 8 June 2012, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-russia-protests-idUSBRE8570ZH20120608; Anastasia 
Bazenkova, “Foreign Publishers Quit Russia over Media 
Ownership Law”, The Moscow Times, 9 September 2015, https:// 
themoscowtimes.com/articles/foreign-publishers-quit-russia-
over-media-ownership-law-49421; Will Wright, “Russia’s Inter-
net Crackdown”, Center for International Media Assistance (on-
line), 28 April 2016, http://www.cima.ned.org/blog/russia-
internet-crackdown/ (all accessed 6 March 2017). 
36 The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law “Civic Free-
dom Monitor: Russia”, Icnl.org (online), last update on 23 Au-
gust 2016, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html; 
Sean Guillory, “Repression and Gay Rights in Russia”, The 
Nation, 26 September 2013, http://www.thenation.com/article/ 
repression-and-gay-rights-russia/ (both accessed 6 March 2017). 
37 Tanya Lokshina, “Draconian Law Rammed through 
Russian Parliament”, The World Post, 24 June 2016, http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/tanya-lokshina/draconian-law-
rammed-thro_b_10634674.html (accessed 6 March 2017). 
substantially undermines the fundamental principles 
of Russian criminal law.38 Putin promulgated this 
repressive line in his discourse and has not hesitated 
to sign the relevant laws. 
In 2014 an important change was made to the court 
system that is revealing about both the Medvedev phase 
and Putin’s goals. The media called attention to the 
fact that the highest instances of the criminal and 
civil court system and of the previously independent 
system of arbitrage courts – the Supreme Court and 
the Supreme Court of Arbitration, respectively – were 
to be united following a proposal by the president. A 
closer reading of the legal text reveals, however, that 
the latter was dissolved and its tasks taken over by 
the former.39 This is surprising because the Supreme 
Court of Arbitration had a very good reputation and 
was known for its relative independence. Its last Presi-
dent, Anton Ivanov, was a prominent judge and friend 
of Medvedev’s. 
Following the reform, the Supreme Court of Arbi-
tration was replaced by an arbitration subgroup con-
sisting of 30 people and led by Oleg Sviridenko, who 
has been convincingly accused of plagiarism in his 
post-doctoral dissertation.40 A series of filters in the 
selection process of new judges excluded almost all 
candidates who were close to Anton Ivanov from being 
appointed. Well-informed observers both in and out-
side of Russia came to the conclusion that an inno-
vative and competent institution had been dissolved 
to allow the leadership to exercise closer political con-
trol over the entire court system – including economic 
disputes.41 More than 80 lawyers signed a letter to 
President Putin, the state Duma and the Federal 
 
38 Gleb Bogush, “Killing Russian Criminal Law”, Carnegie 
Moscow Center (online), 7 July 2016, http://carnegie.ru/ 
commentary/?fa=64030 (accessed 6 March 2017). 
39 Ekaterina Mishina, “Who Shall Judge?” (New York: Insti-
tute of Modern Russia, 30 September 2014), http://imrussia. 
org/en/analysis/law/2040-who-shall-judge (accessed 6 March 
2017). 
40 The accusations were rejected by an academic commis-
sion (disssowjet), to which Sviridenko himself belonged: Eka-
terina Shutova, “Sud’ja Sviridenko ostalsja doktorom” [Judge 
Sviridenko remains a Doctor], gazeta.ru, 15 December 2015, 
http://www.gazeta.ru/science/2015/12/15_a_7970441.shtml 
(accessed 6 March 2017). 
41 William Partlett, “Judicial Backsliding in Russia”, Jurist – 
Academic Commentary, 30 September 2014, http://www.jurist. 
org/forum/2014/09/william-partlett-russia-reform.php; 
Ekaterina Mishina, “Hostile Takeover: On Putin’s ‘Judicial 
Reform’”, Institute of Modern Russia (online), 17 October 2013, 
http://imrussia.org/en/rule-of-law/578-hostile-takeover-on-
putins-judicial-reform (both accessed 6 March 2017). 
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Assembly, putting forward purely factual arguments 
to protest against this development.42 
However, there are also legal acts from Putin’s third 
term of office that point to a different attitude to the 
law: in particular, Khodorkovsky’s pardon and the early 
release of two Pussy-Riot members43 (both acts from 
December 2013) as well as a partial amnesty of im-
prisoned businessmen in July 2013. The latter, how-
ever, fell far short of the expectations of the entre-
preneurs’ ombudsman, Boris Titov.44 All these actions 
derive from an individual decision by the president – 
even if a law to the requisite effect was passed on his 
initiative. In other words, the acts do not create any 
reliable legal instruments or binding rules for similar 
cases. The isolated nature of these legal acts allows 
President Putin to retain full control over whether or 
not to show mercy. 
In the national context, two basic attitudes towards 
law can thus be discerned. A part of the elite, repre-
sented by Medvedev and a number of practising law-
yers, generally respects the law as a means for setting 
rules and sees justice as a value to be aspired to. Putin 
and other sections of the elite (e.g. most members of 
the Duma and Federal Assembly) consider laws and 
courts to be tools for controlling the Russian people or 
certain subsections thereof. This is without any doubt 
the prevailing attitude among Russia’s elite today. The 
ineffectiveness of that fraction of the elite which sup-
ports the first concept of the law is shown by the fact 
that Medvedev, despite being prime minister, is either 
unwilling or unable to create a counterweight to 
Putin’s treatment of the law. Furthermore, recent 
allegations concerning Medvedev’s involvement in 
various forms of corruption call his potential support 
 
42 “Obrashchenie predstavitelej juridicheskogo biznesa (juri-
dicheskoj pomoshchi/uslug) otnositel’no Zakonoproekta ‘O 
Verchovnom Sude Rossijskoj Federatsii i prokurature Rossijs-
koj Federatsii’” [Appeal by members of the legal sector (legal 
help/services) concerning the draft legislation ‘On the Su-
preme Court of the Russian Federation and the Prosecutor 
General of the Russian Federation’], http://www.rospravo.ru/ 
files/news/59e34fa06e072c1db2b5c78c19f9a2be.pdf (accessed 
6 March 2017). 
43 Three members of the Pussy Rio group were imprisoned 
after occupying the altar zone in a church and performing 
a dance as well as a song with political content. Two were 
released after not quite two years. The third had been freed 
much earlier. 
44 William E. Pomeranz, “How Russia Puts Business behind 
Bars”, Reuters, 5 July 2013, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-
debate/2013/07/05/how-russia-puts-business-behind-bars/ 
(accessed 6 March 2017). 
for a rule-of-law-oriented framework severely into 
question.45 
As regards international law, there is a consensus 
among the Russian elite that legally binding agree-
ments are advantageous for Russia in principle be-
cause they make other actors more predictable. How-
ever, Russia reserves the right to be unpredictable, i.e. 
to disregard international rules if it deems other con-
siderations more important. As shown above, within 
Russia the law is used as an instrument of power and 
not primarily considered an institution that protects 
Russian citizens and grants them certain freedoms. 
The two legal spheres have in common that the top 
echelons of the Russian elite always reserve the right 
to exert control over the situation by means of indi-
vidual decisions and to leave others (whether external 
actors or their own citizens) in the dark over their 
future behaviour. 
 
 
 
45 Shaun Walker, “Dmitry Medvedev: the whipping boy 
for Russia’s discontented”, The Guardian, 30 March 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/30/dmitry-
medvedev-whipping-boy-russia-discontented-protests 
(accessed 24 May 2017). 
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Approaches to Truth and History 
 
Russia’s actions in and towards the Ukraine (and to 
a certain degree Syria as well) and the explanations 
supplied by Moscow have raised the question of how 
much value is attached to the truth in Russian dis-
course. On several occasions, members of the Russian 
political elite told their Western interlocutors out-
right lies. In some cases, these statements were later 
openly acknowledged to have been lies, for instance 
the “little green men” in the Crimea (see below). 
Russia’s intense propaganda and disinformation since 
its occupation of the Crimea have surprised and 
shocked Western governments and media, and have 
triggered a debate on suitable counter-measures. 
This experience of the Russian elite’s uninhibited 
exploitation of the truth raises the issue of how this 
ruthlessness might impact on the way history is rep-
resented by Russia’s decision-makers. What we find 
is that a questionable reading of historical facts and 
events played a key role in Russia’s actions in the Cri-
mea and Donbas, especially in terms of legitimising 
its own behaviour. 
For many Western observers, the annexation of the 
Crimea was not only surprising in itself, but also in 
the degree to which Russian actors ruthlessly manipu-
lated the truth. The presence of armed fighters with-
out insignia, who later turned out to be members of 
the Russian armed and security forces, is only one 
example, albeit the most glaring. This case is also dis-
turbing because Putin suddenly admitted the presence 
of such troops (which went beyond those of the Black 
Sea Fleet) in a television interview with the journalist 
Andrei Kondrashov, after he and other top politicians 
had doggedly denied for weeks that regular military 
forces were involved. His behaviour sent a strong 
signal both domestically and externally: Putin wanted 
to demonstrate that he had knowingly lied to his 
international interlocutors. In other words, the point 
was to destroy any trust that international actors had 
in the predictability of Moscow’s actions. As with its 
use of the law, this method testifies to the desire of 
the Russian elite to show that Russia will not let itself 
be dictated to by anyone. 
The Russian troops and officers in the Donbas rep-
resent a similar situation. So far, however, Putin has 
only conceded that “persons occupied with solving 
certain questions, including in the military domain” 
are present there,46 despite the fact that various inde-
pendent sources have confirmed the presence of regu-
lar Russian soldiers.47 There were numerous lies, too, 
which were intended to corroborate insinuations relat-
ing to developments in Ukraine, namely that right-
wing nationalist forces had great political influence 
in Kiev and that the Ukrainian leadership intended 
to suppress or even kill ethnic Russians and Russian 
speakers in Ukraine. To make these statements cred-
ible, stories were invented, such as the crucifixion of 
a child by Ukrainian soldiers or calls by Ukrainian 
politicians to make using the Russian language pun-
ishable by law.48 Germany has also been the target of 
such accusations, in the so-called “Lisa Case”.49 Even 
though the story had already been proven false, the 
Russian media as well as the Russian Foreign Ministry 
perpetuated their own version. Foreign Minister Lavrov 
even publicly questioned the results of the German 
police investigation.50 
The willingness of the Russian leadership to privi-
lege historical association over international law has 
also astonished Western observers. Putin repeatedly 
emphasised the common history of the Crimea and 
Russia during his speech at a solemn ceremony on 18 
March 2014, at which he called on the Federal Council 
to make the Crimea and Sevastopol subjects of the 
 
46 “Vladimir Putin’s Annual Press Conference”, 17 December 
2015, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50971 (ac-
cessed 6 March 2017). 
47 See the sources mentioned in note 14. 
48 Julia Smirnova, “Die Stunde der Scharfmacher im Ukraine-
Konflikt”, Die Welt (online), 14 July 2014, http://www.welt.de/ 
politik/ausland/article130153118/Die-Stunde-der-Scharfmacher- 
im-Ukraine-Konflikt.html; “Russia TV Fake Oleg: Tyagnibok 
Calls to Ban Russian Language in Ukraine”, 5 March 2014, 
http://www.stopfake.org/en/russian-tv-fake-oleg-tyagnibok-
calls-to-ban-russian-language-in-ukraine/ (both accessed 6 
March 2017). 
49 Russian media had reported that a thirteen-year-old Ger-
man-Russian girl had been raped by immigrants in Berlin. 
This turned out not to be the case. 
50 Julia Smirnova, “Lawrow wirft deutschen Behörden ‘Ver-
tuschung’ vor”, Die Welt (online), 26 January 2016, http://www. 
welt.de/politik/ausland/article151483331/Lawrow-wirft-
deutschen-Behoerden-Vertuschung-vor.html (accessed 6 
March 2017). 
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Russian Federation. This implicitly placed the legiti-
mising power of the peninsula’s historic connection 
to Russia above international law (in the sense of the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of states). History 
was also used to justify Russia’s actions in Eastern 
Ukraine, albeit less adamantly and aggressively. Among 
other things, the historic term Novorossiya (New Russia) 
was used to propagandise the supposedly shared iden-
tity of the areas in Ukraine’s east and south, which had 
been an administrative unit at the end of the Russian 
Empire. While this term has largely disappeared from 
the official discourse, at least for now, its deliberate 
introduction into the debate testifies to the willing-
ness of the Russian elite to use historical constructs 
to legitimise its actions. 
Approaches to History 
Is this approach to history and truth by the Russian 
elite a new phenomenon? To answer that question, at 
least for history, it is important to examine Russia’s 
relationship with World War Two. No other historical 
event has such significance in Russia. Under Putin, its 
importance in the official discourse has increased still 
further. Almost from the start of his presidency, Putin 
has time and again raised the subject of Russia’s suf-
fering and victory in the “Great Patriotic War”, and 
used the commemoration of it to legitimise his gov-
ernment. He has re-introduced the tradition of mili-
tary parades and revived the ritual of the so-called 
“remembrance lessons” (uroki pamjati), in which Rus-
sian pupils meet war veterans to honour the sacrifices 
made during the war.51 
This development is in part a reaction to concerns 
during the Medvedev era that other representations 
of World War Two – especially from other post-Soviet 
states – might challenge the official Russian version. 
To counteract these supposed tendencies, a Commis-
sion to Resist Attempts to Falsify History to Damage 
Russia’s Interests was created by the Russian president 
in 2009 to deal above all with historiographical 
approaches that supposedly relativise or do not suf-
ficiently acknowledge Russia’s role in World War Two. 
The timing of its creation was probably due to the up-
coming 70th anniversary of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. On 
that occasion, the Russian elite expected a wave of 
 
51 Elizabeth A. Wood, “Performing Memory: Vladimir Putin 
and the Celebration of WWII in Russia”, The Soviet and Post-
Soviet Review 38, no. 2 (2011): 172–200. 
critical foreign representations of the Soviet leader-
ship at the time, which it aimed to counter, inter alia, 
through the commission’s work.52 
At almost the same time as the commission was set 
up, the Russian authorities closed down a website that 
had been an important source of documents and other 
information for historians both in and outside of 
Russia. In conjunction with the shutting down of this 
website, the British historian Orlando Figes complained 
that the Kremlin was deliberately using bloggers to 
propagate the official Russian version of historical 
events and discredit foreign historians.53 However, 
on the whole the Commission’s work barely made an 
impression. Apart from the few publications that it 
inspired, its work remained vague and strictly circum-
scribed. In early 2012 it was quietly disbanded.54 And 
yet concerns that Russia’s actions and role in the 1930s 
and 1940s might be interpreted “wrongly” remained. 
In February 2014 a draft law dating from 2009 was 
revived that criminalises, among other things, the 
deliberate dissemination of false information con-
cerning the activities of the Soviet Union during World 
War Two. One of the bill’s authors was the current 
Culture Minister, Vladimir Medinsky. It was signed 
into effect by Putin in May 2014.55 
The state’s attempts to control historiography also 
concern the evaluation of Joseph Stalin. Official repre-
sentations are usually ambivalent, pointing out both 
positive and negative aspects of his regime. The his-
 
52 James Rodgers, “Russia Acts against ‘False’ History”, BBC 
News (online), 24 July 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
8166020.stm (accessed 6 March 2017). 
53 Luke Harding, “British Academics Protest after Russia 
Closes Down History Website”, The Guardian, 13 July 2009, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/13/russia-shuts-
history-website (accessed 6 March 2017). 
54 “V fevrale 2012 goda ukazom Prezidenta Rossii byla prek-
rashchena dejatel’nost’ Komissii po protivodejstviju fal’sifi-
katsii v ushcherb interesam Rossii” [In February 2012 a presi-
dential decree put an end to the activities of the Commission 
to Resist Attempts to Falsify History to Damage Russia’s Inter-
ests], 29 March 2012, http://narotchnitskaya.com/commission-
on-antifraud-stories/v-fevrale-2012-goda-ukazom-prezidenta-
rossii-byila-prekrashhena-deyatelnost-komissii-po-protivo 
deystviyu-falsifikatsii-istorii-v-ushherb-interesam-rossii.html 
(accessed 6 March 2017). 
55 Ivan Kurilla, The Implications of Russia’s Law against the “Reha-
bilitation of Nazism”, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo no. 331 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for European, Russian and Eura-
sian Studies, The Elliott School of International Affairs, 
George Washington University, August 2014), http://www. 
ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/ 
Pepm331_Kurilla_August2014_0.pdf (accessed 6 March 2017). 
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tory textbooks that have received the Education Minis-
try’s official stamp of approval describe Stalin as an 
“efficient manager” who led the Soviet Union through 
the “Great Patriotic War” and a successful process 
of industrialisation, but who was also a “dictator” 
responsible for massive repression. The overall trend, 
however, is towards reinforcing the positive aspects 
and sweeping the unpleasant ones under the carpet. 
This tendency is also noticeable in the official stance 
on the Gulag system, which culminated under Stalin. 
The most notable example is the transformation of the 
Perm-36 Museum, Russia’s only Gulag museum to be 
located on the grounds of a former labour camp. The 
labour camp persisted long after Stalin’s era and was 
finally closed in 1987. In 1995 it became a site com-
memorating the history of political repression, run 
by the NGO Perm-36 and co-financed by the regional 
government. 
From 2013 the board of trustees and the closely 
associated cultural association “Memorial-Perm” were 
increasingly harassed by the regional administration. 
Payments were withheld, leaving the museum unable 
to pay its electricity and gas bills. As a result, it was 
forced to close. In the summer of 2014, it was re-opened 
under the trusteeship of the local authorities, but 
with a different focus. It no longer aims to keep alive 
the memory of political repression during the Soviet 
era, but instead emphasises the contribution detainees 
made to building socialism and making possible the 
victory in the “Great Patriotic War”, thus justifying 
their forced labour. The current director, Yelena 
Mamaeva, has warned commentators not to judge 
Stalin in any way, shape or form because it would not 
be “politically correct”.56 The museum’s fate coincides 
with a policy on history that clearly aims to stifle seri-
ous attempts to confront the past and instead puts the 
emphasis on aspects of Stalin’s reign of terror which 
are politically useful in the contemporary political 
environment. This trend goes hand in hand with the 
publication of a new standardised history textbook 
for all Russian schools, which has been in use since 
September 2016. The idea of a standardised version of 
history is supported and driven by both Putin and the 
current Education Minister, Olga Vasilyeva. 
 
56 Mikhail Danilovich and Robert Coalson, “Revamped Perm-
36 Museum Emphasizes Gulag’s ‘Contribution to Victory’”, 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (online), 25 July 2015, http:// 
www.rferl.org/content/russia-perm-Gulag-museum-takeover-
contribution-to-victory/27152188.html (accessed 6 March 
2017). 
There are thus many indications that the Russian 
elites choose to instrumentalise history for political 
purposes. The representation of historical events 
sanctioned by the state is not the outcome of a pro-
fessional debate based on diverse sources and leading 
to plausible results, but rather a version which is 
orientated towards the current political interests of 
the Russian leadership and which is used, for example, 
to legitimise certain undertakings. Dissenting versions 
of history are not tolerated, whether they come from 
foreign or domestic actors. The emergence of this 
policy on history could already be discerned in the 
years before the annexation of the Crimea. 
Approaches to Truth: The Case of the Media 
Where history is concerned, there are, therefore, clear 
trends towards establishing a single accepted inter-
pretation of certain events – an interpretation that 
cannot be challenged. However, many observers have 
come to the conclusion that Russian officialdom’s 
approach to the truth more broadly is in fact to call 
into question the existence of any single “true” version 
of an event.57 The “hybrid operation” conducted to 
this end employs a number of different means.58 
This study limits its examination of the Russian 
elite’s approach to the truth to the policy pursued by 
Russia’s decision-makers towards the official media – 
both those targeting a domestic audience and those 
aimed at (Western) foreign countries. There has been a 
definite trend in the past decade in those media which 
focus on audiences abroad, exemplified by the change 
in the television channel Russia Today (now known as 
RT). Russia Today was launched in 2005. Its then editor-
in-chief, Margarita Simonyan, declared that her task 
was to change Russia’s image throughout the world. 
Accordingly, Russia Today broadcast numerous posi-
tive news items from Russia, although international 
news also played an important part in its reporting. 
The young Russia Today team also attracted ambitious 
foreign journalists and soon gained a reputation for 
professionalism. The channel’s ratings, however, grew 
more slowly than expected. That changed with the 
 
57 See especially Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing Is True and Every-
thing Is Possible (New York, 2014). 
58 Keir Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Con-
tinuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power, Research 
Paper (London: Chatham House, March 2016), https://www. 
chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/ 
2016-03-russia-new-tools-giles.pdf (accessed 6 March 2017). 
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war between Georgia and Russia in the summer of 
2008, during which Russia Today had a virtual mo-
nopoly on presenting the Russian position. However, 
some journalists in the team were already complain-
ing that the discourse from Moscow was impossible 
to reconcile with events on the ground.59 
In the years that followed, foreign journalists 
increasingly left RT because they considered the ap-
proach to the truth expected of them to be increasing-
ly problematic. Since then, the channel’s reporting 
on Western countries has noticeably altered. During 
Medvedev’s presidency, reports on the US, for example, 
were at times favourable.60 RT’s reporting during the 
past few years demonstrates, however, that the chan-
nel aims to portray the West as chaotic and plagued 
with serious socioeconomic problems. A clear example 
of this type of reporting is to be found in the RT broad-
casts on the Occupy Movement in the US in 2011,61 
even if the outlet’s primary objective at the time was 
probably to provide a propaganda counterweight to 
events that reflected badly on Russia. Clear evidence of 
lies and distorted representations, especially concern-
ing developments in Ukraine, did not emerge until 
2014. Two journalists who left RT that year (Sarah Firth 
and Liz Wahl) complained of the misleading and 
plainly mendacious reporting about the crisis in and 
over Ukraine. However, both also acknowledged that 
the channel’s approach to the events in Ukraine had 
merely been the last straw for them, and that they had 
already been dissatisfied with the reporting on other, 
earlier events.62 The British media watchdog Ofcom 
 
59 Oliver Bullough, “Inside Russia Today: Counterweight 
to the Mainstream Media, or Putin’s Mouthpiece?”, The New 
Statesman, 10 May 2013, http://www.newstatesman.com/world-
affairs/world-affairs/2013/05/inside-russia-today-counterweight- 
mainstream-media-or-putins-mou; Jill Dougherty, “How 
the Media Became One of Putin’s Most Powerful Weapons”, 
The Atlantic, 21 April 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
international/archive/2015/04/how-the-media-became-putins-
most-powerful-weapon/391062/ (both accessed 6 March 2017). 
60 Thomas Sherlock, “Confronting the Stalinist Past: The 
Politics of Memory in Russia”, The Washington Quarterly 34, 
no. 2 (2011): 93–109, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/twq11springsherlock.pdf 
(accessed 6 March 2017). 
61 Bullough, “Inside Russia Today” (see note 59). 
62 David McCormack, “‘I’d Looked the Other Way as the Net-
work Smeared America’ Journalist who Resigned On-air from 
Russia Today Slams Network for Being Putin’s Propaganda 
Machine”, The Daily Mail, 23 March 2014, http://www.dailymail. 
co.uk/news/article-2587281/Id-looked-way-network-smeared-
America-Journalist-resigned-air-Russia-Today-slams-network-
Putins-propaganda-machine.html; John Plunkett, “Russia 
also found that RT’s reporting on Syria and Ukraine 
had violated the British Broadcasting Code on several 
occasions, and issued warnings and fines.63 
In other words, RT’s willingness to forgo profes-
sional reporting and disseminate lies seems to have 
grown since 2014. However, this tendency did pre-
exist, if less forcefully. Since the channel is entirely 
financed by the Russian state, we can safely assume 
that Russia’s leaders approve of the approach to the 
truth practised by RT. This interpretation is supported 
by statements made by Deputy Communication Minis-
ter Alexei Wolin to a group of students at the Journal-
ism Faculty of Lomonosov Moscow State University. 
According to Wolin, future journalists should be ready 
to adapt entirely to the agenda of their employer, who 
should be considered an uncle (djadja). This uncle, he 
said, would tell them what to write and how to write 
it, and what not to write about certain issues – which 
was his right, since he was paying them. It should be 
absolutely clear to any journalist, he claimed, that their 
task was not to make the world a better place, to carry 
the torch of truth or to put humanity on the right 
path. None of this was his or her job. The mission of 
journalists was to increase their employer’s profits.64 
The deputy minister’s words masked the influence 
that politics has on the media. However, they were a 
frank expression of his view that the media should not 
care about the truth, but merely about the agenda of 
their respective proprietors. That, for him, is the prin-
ciple of journalistic work. 
Accordingly, the few media outlets that report 
critically on political and economic developments in 
Russia and operate to professional standards are in-
creasingly put under pressure. Those which have a 
reputation for being critical of the regime have been 
harassed for years, even if they have been allowed to 
continue to work. The prime example is the radio 
station Echo Moskvy, owned by Gazprom Media 
 
Today Reporter Resigns in Protest at MH17 Coverage”, The 
Guardian, 18 July 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/media/ 
2014/jul/18/mh17-russia-today-reporter-resigns-sara-firth-
kremlin-malaysia (both accessed 6 March 2017). 
63 Jasper Jackson, “RT Sanctioned by Ofcom over Series of 
Misleading and Biased Articles”, The Guardian, 21 September 
2015, http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/sep/21/rt-
sanctioned-over-series-of-misleading-articles-by-media-
watchdog (accessed 6 March 2017). 
64 Anastasija Ivanova, “‘Sejchas chochetsja verit’, chto ja 
budu pisat’ tol’ko pravdu’” [Right now I’d like to think 
that I’ll only write the truth], Bol’shoj gorod, 11 February 2013, 
http://bg.ru/education/otvet_mgu_volinu-17070/ (accessed 
6 March 2017). 
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Holding but allowed to report largely independently. 
Under its statutes, the editor-in-chief (Alexei Venedik-
tov, since 1998) has the final say about programming 
content. This supposed autonomy is nonetheless time 
and again disputed from above,65 making the station’s 
survival uncertain. The much younger independent 
television channel Dozhd, founded in 2010, has pro-
gressively experienced problems with the authorities, 
in particular since 2014. The harassment ranges from 
the withdrawal of cable licenses, to being forced to 
move premises, to searches because of alleged viola-
tions against extremism and terrorism legislation.66 
The Internet and social networks have also been 
confronted by restrictive measures. In July 2012 a law 
was passed publishing a “black list” of websites that 
were allegedly harmful to children. Initially, these 
were primarily sites that glorified drugs, discussed 
suicide or included pornographic content. The fol-
lowing year, however, the law was extended to include 
political extremism, very broadly defined. Courts sub-
sequently reached a series of dubious verdicts.67 Since 
August 2014 bloggers have had to register with the 
authorities by providing their name and contact in-
formation if they have more than 3,000 readers. The 
Russian leadership’s attention was also drawn to 
social media by the 2011/2012 protests, some of which 
were anti-regime in character. Subsequently, it re-
sorted to measures whose purpose was to gain control 
of the Russian social network VKontakte, founded and 
run by Pavel Durov.68 Durov eventually gave up and 
 
65 “Ekho Moskvy Chief Alleges Censorship in Cancellation of 
Putin Critic’s Show”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (online), 25 
May 2016, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-ekho-moskvy-
albats-cancelation-censorship/27757576.html; “Echo No More? 
An Ominous Threat to an Independent Radio Station Just 
before an Election”, The Economist, 18 February 2012, http:// 
www.economist. com/node/21547868 (both accessed 6 March 
2017). 
66 Shaun Walker, “TV Rain: Inside Russia’s Only Independent 
Television Channel”, The Guardian, 9 June 2015, http://www. 
theguardian.com/cities/2015/jun/09/tv-rain-russia-only-
independent-television-channel; “Russia: Harassment of Dozhd 
TV Channel Must End”, Article19 (online), 9 December 2015, 
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38214/en/ 
russia:-harassment-of-dozhd-tv-channel-must-end (both 
accessed 6 March 2017). 
67 Natalia Yudina, “Got Tagged? Get Fined! Russia’s Battle 
against ‘Digital Extremism’”, Open Democracy (online), 24 
August 2016, http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/ 
natalia-yudina/got-tagged-get-fined-russia-s-battle-against-
digital-extremism (accessed 6 March 2017). 
68 Joshua Yaffa, “Is Pavel Durov, Russia’s Zuckerberg, a 
Kremlin Target?”, Bloomberg (online), 7 August 2013, http:// 
left not only the company, but Russia as well. By way 
of farewell, he wrote on his page on VKontakte: “The 
freedom of action of the chief executive in managing 
the company has considerably decreased. It has been 
harder and harder to remain with those principles on 
which our social network is based”.69 
As a final point, over the past few years the Russian 
authorities have continued to extend their influence 
over television networks, with the result that political 
opinions conveyed by the channels have become in-
creasingly uniform. This policy is in keeping with 
Putin’s attitude towards the media, which corresponds 
to Deputy Communication Minister Wolin’s statement 
quoted above. According to Alexei Venediktov of Echo 
Moskvy, Putin had outlined his understanding of 
media activity early on in his presidency: “Here’s an 
owner, they have their own politics, and for them it 
[the media organisation] is an instrument. The govern-
ment also is an owner and the media that belong to 
the government must carry out our instructions. And 
media that belong to private businessmen, they follow 
their orders. Look at [Rupert] Murdoch. Whatever he 
says, will be.”70 Under Putin, media owners who did 
not show sufficient loyalty to the Kremlin were sys-
tematically and swiftly silenced.71 Recently, this trend 
has become even more pronounced. The political sci-
entist Maria Lipman had already come to the conclu-
sion in 2009 that in Russia “the media [were] reduced 
to being a political tool of the state or marginalized 
to a point of making no difference in policy-making”. 
Already at the time, the “three major national [tele-
vision] channels [were] used as tools of state propa-
ganda in a way that [was] increasingly reminiscent 
of the Soviet days”.72 
Since the Russian elite has sanctioned curtailing 
the freedom of the press and controls the national 
 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-01/is-pavel-durov-
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70 Dougherty, “How the Media Became One of Putin’s Most 
Powerful Weapons” (see note 59). 
71 It should be pointed out, however, that the owners in 
question were Russian oligarchs, who used their media to 
further their own political and economic interests. 
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television channels,73 there can be no doubt as to its 
attitude to both truth and propaganda. Its members 
are convinced, firstly, that the media are a vehicle for 
conveying specific messages to the Russian people 
and/or to a foreign audience; secondly, that the pri-
ority is their usefulness for the regime, and not their 
truth content. Consequently, the latter can be dis-
pensed with if necessary. 
 
 
 
73 On the president’s possibilities for exercising control, see 
especially Eline Gordts, “Putin’s Press: How Russia’s President 
Controls the News”, The World Post, 24 October 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/vladimir-putin-russia-
news-media_us_56215944e4b0bce34700b1df (accessed 6 
March 2017). 
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The National Interest and Concepts of Public Welfare 
 
Many observers have wondered what Russia’s ultimate 
motivation was in becoming militarily involved in 
Ukraine or later in Syria. Some cited geopolitical con-
siderations; others pointed to the correlation between 
Moscow’s agendas in foreign and domestic policy. 
According to the latter, Russia’s foreign-policy initia-
tives need to be seen as closely connected to its efforts 
to shore up the leadership’s (and especially the presi-
dent’s) legitimacy and popularity. This raises the ques-
tion of how precisely the Russian elite defines the 
national interest. As Fyodor Lukyanov has pointed out, 
at least in recent times Russia has privileged security 
issues above the requirements of economic moderni-
sation.74 But since Russia’s economic situation has 
deteriorated, the issue of how significant (or not) the 
public welfare75 is in the decisions taken by the Rus-
sian elite has become increasingly pressing. 
One plausible hypothesis concerns the transforma-
tion of the social contract between Russia’s elite and 
its citizens. For many years during Putin’s reign, there 
was an implicit agreement between the rulers and the 
ruled, according to which the people abstained from 
political participation in return for a steadily improv-
ing economic situation. Now the elite seems to have 
unilaterally modified the contract. Citizens are ex-
pected to forgo political participation as before; how-
ever, in exchange they no longer receive increasing 
wealth, but rather pride in Russia as a great power 
that is taken seriously on the world stage. This shift in 
values implies that society must tolerate even deterio-
rating economic conditions: instead of furnishing 
material goods, the elite provides for citizens using 
 
74 Fyodor Lukyanov, “Putin’s Foreign Policy: The Quest to 
Restore Russia’s Rightful Place”, Foreign Affairs, (May/June 
2016), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2016-
04-18/putins-foreign-policy (accessed 6 March 2017). 
75 The public welfare (or “common good”) can be defined 
as “the well-being of all members of a community, meaning 
not the private welfare of the individual, but rather the pub-
lic interests of the people living together”: see the article 
“Gemeinwohl”. http://www.theoriewiki.org/index.php?title= 
Gemeinwohl (accessed 6 March 2017). Even if the Russian 
equivalent (obshchee blago) is rarely encountered in official 
statements, declarations by top state actors about wanting 
to promote the well-being of the Russian people are certainly 
part of conventional political discourse. 
immaterial goods, namely prestige and a worthy place 
in history. 
To understand what Russia defines as the national 
interest, it is worth looking at the National Security 
Strategy. This document, which is revised at irregular 
intervals, addresses an extensive range of topics from 
foreign and security policy to economic and social 
policy. The way in which each topic is described and 
weighted provides an insight into the Russian elite’s 
priorities – at least the public ones. 
The crisis in and over Ukraine led to a revision of 
the National Security Strategy. The latest version was 
published on 31 December 2015. A major focus is now 
the international prestige of the Russian Federation. 
The resulting obligation to secure Russia’s status as a 
great power is presented as a fundamental interest of 
the country that must be pursued in the long term.76 
However, the concept of security as used in the docu-
ment is defined very broadly and relates above all to 
domestic Russian issues. It does not concern merely 
the protection and defence of the Russian state, but 
also the following subjects: the quality of life of Rus-
sia’s citizens, the economy, science and education, 
health, culture and the environment. This suggests 
that improving living conditions in the socioeconomic 
sense is a priority for the Russian regime. 
This emphasis was already in place in the previous 
security strategy, dating from 2009. That document 
also covered a wide range of topics, including those 
mentioned in the new 2015 strategy.77 One of its focal 
points was the country’s economic development. The 
well-known economist Ruslan Grinberg went so far as 
to claim that the document ranked economic security 
over traditional security issues, and even made it the 
 
76 On the National Security Strategy, see especially Olga 
Oliker, Unpacking Russia’s New National Security Strategy 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 7 January 2016), http://www.csis.org/analysis/ 
unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy; the 
document itself (in Russian) is available at http://static. 
kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/l8iXkR8XLAtxeilX7JK3XX 
y6Y0AsHD5v.pdf (both accessed 6 March 2017). 
77 The text of the 2009 National Security Strategy (in Eng-
lish) can be found at http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-
national-security-strategy-to-2020 (accessed 6 March 2017). 
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top priority.78 Indeed, five of the seven indicators 
that the strategy paper cites as measures of national 
security levels deal with economic performance. 
The Significance of Public Welfare 
In other words, the priorities set by the security strat-
egies of 2009 and 2015 resemble each other. Judging 
by the two documents, the public welfare of citizens 
is important to the Russian elite. The yearly speeches 
of the Russian president to the Federal Assembly 
(poslanija) and other appearances by top members 
of the Russian elite confirm this impression.79 In his 
poslanie of 1 December 20016, for example, Putin 
stated: “The basis of our entire policy is to take care of 
people and increase human capital as Russia’s most 
important resource. Therefore, our efforts are aimed 
at supporting the traditional values and the family, at 
implementing demographic programmes, improving 
the environment and people’s health, and promoting 
education and culture.”80 However, there is a wide gap 
between the goals mentioned in the strategy papers 
and the actual developments in Russia’s regions in 
sectors such as education and health. This discrepancy 
raises the question of what significance the Russian 
political elite really ascribes to public welfare issues. 
This supposed priority becomes ever more doubtful if 
we take into account the extent of corruption within 
the elite, through which the rich get richer while the 
resources available for public welfare purposes simul-
taneously decrease. 
In 2005, so-called “national projects” were initiated 
in science and education, the health system, housing 
and agriculture. State investments were meant to help 
drive development in these sectors. At the projects’ 
launch, Putin declared: “Concentrating budget and 
administrative resources on raising the quality of life 
of Russia’s citizens is a necessary and logical continua-
tion of the economic course that we have steered over 
 
78 Keir Giles, “Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020” 
(Rome: NATO Defense College, June 2009), http://www. 
conflictstudies.org.uk/files/rusnatsecstrategyto2020.pdf 
(accessed 6 March 2017). 
79 The annual speeches are all available in Russian and Eng-
lish at http://www.kremlin.ru. See also “Interview Transcript: 
Dmitry Medvedev” (see note 27). 
80 Vladimir Putin, “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu sobra-
niiu” [The president’s speech to the Federal Assembly], Prezi-
dent Rossii (online), 1 December 2016, http://kremlin.ru/ 
events/president/news/53379 (accessed 6 March 2017). 
the past five years and will continue to steer. It is a 
guarantee against the sluggish using-up of resources 
without palpable results. This is a course of investing 
in people – and that means: towards Russia’s future.”81 
Dmitry Medvedev, who was first deputy prime minis-
ter at the time, was given the task of supervising the 
national projects. 
Years later, both Putin and Medvedev gave a positive 
evaluation of the outcomes of the national projects.82 
Other observers, however, assess the situation much 
more critically. As an article for the tenth anniversary 
of the projects’ launch phrased it: “Nobody discontin-
ued the projects, they somehow disappeared by them-
selves, and now the shame-faced initiators and imple-
menters avoid any mention of these “corpses”.83 The 
article concludes that – despite great sums being 
made available, especially for the health system and 
housing – improvements only occurred in the agri-
cultural sector. These improvements, however, were 
not due to the corresponding national project. In 
general, the author points to three problems. First, 
bureaucracy and corruption swallowed most of the 
money which was made available. Second, the neces-
sary conditions – such as a positive business climate – 
had not been created, which had an indirect impact 
on the projects. Finally, the financial crisis of 2008–
2009 caused a drop in the amounts provided. 
Other observers also find little to praise in the infra-
structure campaign. A report by the reputed thinktank 
INSOR merely acknowledges that the health-system 
project has prevented a reduction in state spending 
in this sector because of the additional resources ob-
tained. A different analyst makes some positive remarks 
– for example, concerning the project’s contribution 
 
81 Mikhail Mel’nikov, “Ne chokajas’: vspominaem prioritet-
nye natsprojekty” [No toasts: We remember the national pri-
ority projects], Russkaja planeta, 21 October 2015, http://rusplt.ru/ 
society/ne-chokayas-vspominaem-prioritetnyie-natsproektyi-
19327.html (accessed 6 March 2017). 
82 Medvedev was referring to the national project in hous-
ing, “Zasedanie Obshchestvennogo komiteta storonnikov i 
regional’nogo aktiva partii ‘Edinaja Rossija’” [Session of the 
social committee of supporters and regional activists of 
the United Russia party], 15 November 2011, http://kremlin. 
ru/events/president/news/13521; Putin to all four areas, “Zase-
danie Sovjeta po strategicheskomu razvitiju i prioritetnym 
proektam” [Session of the council for strategic development 
and priority projects], Prezident Rossii (online), 13 July 2016, 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52504 (both accessed 
6 March 2017). 
83 Mel’nikov, “Ne chokajas’” (see note 81). 
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to reducing the mortality rate.84 In general, however, 
evaluations of the national projects as a whole are 
mainly negative. 
The education and health sectors deserve closer 
attention beyond the national projects, because they 
clarify the elite’s attitudes to public services. However, 
the focus here is not primarily on whether or not there 
is a gap between the aims set by the elite and the 
results actually obtained. After all, measures decided 
“at the very top” can be sabotaged by the middle or 
lower ranks of bureaucracy, even if the initiators had 
the best of intentions. A helpful insight into the elite’s 
real priorities is provided by data on spending on 
these sectors as a percentage of Russia’s gross domes-
tic product (GDP). The figures become even more ex-
pressive if we additionally examine the ways in which 
the programmes were implemented, to get at least 
an indirect look at the main actors’ attitudes in these 
areas. 
Both in education and health, government spend-
ing has been substantially below the OECD average for 
years. Russia’s defence budget, on the other hand, is 
average or even above average. A look at the evolution 
in spending shows that funds for the military have 
steadily increased during the past few years, whereas 
those for education and health have stagnated or even 
decreased.85 
Educational policy 
There is a broad consensus among observers that the 
reforms of the education system have so far amounted 
to no more than commercialisation intended to absorb 
some of the state’s financial burden. Numerous schools 
have been closed, and in many places the number of 
state-funded spots at university for gifted pupils has 
been reduced. A school curriculum has been adopted 
that contains certain core subjects, while additional 
subjects require supplementary fees. The introduction 
of a new entrance exam for higher education has not 
only failed to get rid of the corruption that had accom-
 
84 G. E. Ulumbekova, “Sistema zdravochranenija Rossijskoj 
Federatsii: itogi, problemy, vyzovy i puti reshenija” [The health 
system of the Russian Federation: results, problems, chal-
lenges and solutions], Vestnik Roszdravnadzora, no. 2 (2012):  
33–38 (33). 
85 Andrey Chernyavskiy, “Budget Spending to Exceed Rev-
enues in 2015”, National Research University, Higher School of Eco-
nomics (online), 24 September 2014, https://iq.hse.ru/en/news/ 
177666733.html (accessed 13 March 2017). 
panied the previous procedure, but has also led to 
parents spending more on private tutors.86 The state 
has thus displaced numerous items from its education 
budget onto other actors, with the result that the edu-
cational possibilities of students from less well-off 
backgrounds have worsened. 
In 2013 the Duma decided to reform the Academy 
of Sciences. While this restructuring had been under 
discussion for some time, the new legislation was 
passed abruptly and without involving the Academy’s 
leadership.87 The reform is highly controversial 
among scientists.88 Some observers see the sudden 
action by the legislature as Putin’s personal vendetta89 
against the Academy, for spurning his protégé, 
Mikhail Kovalchuk.90 Others interpret it as a move by 
the state to appropriate the Academy’s property: the 
 
86 Augusto Come, “Corruption, Corruption, Corruption”, 
Open Democracy (online), 29 November 2012, http://www. 
opendemocracy.net/od-russia/augusto-come/corruption-
corruption-corruption; Sergey G. Kosaretsky et al., School 
System and Educational Policy in a Highly Stratified Post-Soviet 
Society: The Importance of Social Context, Research Paper 
no. WP BRP 22/PA/2014 (Moscow: National Research Uni-
versity, Higher School of Economics, 9 December 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535806; 
Viktor Katona, “What Is Lacking in Russia’s Strategy to Re-
form Its Higher Education?”, Russia Direct (online), 19 August 
2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/what-lacking-
russias-state-strategy-reform-its-higher-education (all accessed 
13 March 2017). 
87 Irina Dezhina, Russia’s Academy of Sciences’ Reform: Causes and 
Consequences for Russian Science, Russie.Nei.Visions no. 77 (Paris: 
Institut français des relations internationales, May 2014), 20, 
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifri_rnv_77_ 
ran_reforma_eng_dezhina_may_2014.pdf (accessed 6 March 
2017). 
88 Oleg Sukhov, “Reform Will Lead to Death of Russian 
Science, Academicians Warn”, The Moscow Times, 24 December 
2016, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/reform-will-lead-
to-death-of-russian-science-academicians-warn-30739 (accessed 
6 March 2017). 
89 Julia Latynina, “Reforms Spell the End for Russian Sciences”, 
The Moscow Times, 25 September 2013, https://themoscowtimes. 
com/articles/reforms-spell-the-end-for-russian-sciences-27969 
(accessed 6 March 2017). 
90 The physicist Mikhail Kovalchuk is the older brother of 
Yury Kovalchuk, the chairman of Rossiya Bank, also called 
“Putin’s personal banker”. The Academy had rejected Mikhail 
Kovalchuk as director of the Institute for Crystallography and 
later also refused him a post from which he could have risen 
to become the Academy’s director. Instead, Kovalchuk was 
assigned the directorship of the Kurchatov Institute, which is 
administered separately from the Academy and whose direc-
tor is appointed by the prime minister. In the past few years, 
the Kurchatov Institute has managed to bring more and more 
facilities and projects under its control. 
The Significance of Public Welfare 
SWP Berlin 
Fundamental Attitudes of the Russian Political Elite 
June 2017 
 
 
 
25 
reform created a new institution, the Federal Agency 
for Scientific Facilities (FANO), to take over responsi-
bility for the Academy’s finances and property 
(buildings, equipment, etc.). The reform’s main 
problem seems to be the insufficiently clear separa-
tion of powers between FANO and the Academy, 
which is a consequence of the reform being rushed 
through and still causes protests.91 Even though the 
Academy evidently needed to be reformed, the 
measures chosen and the speed with which they have 
been implemented is not convincing and points to 
vested interests. 
Political actors at the highest level are also clearly 
interfering in issues related to textbooks. Up to 2014, 
many publishing houses (including smaller ones) had 
a share of the school book market. There was some 
competition among the publishers and therefore a 
certain diversity of books for various school subjects. 
In 2014 all publishing houses suddenly had to meet 
new criteria. Some were disqualified immediately; 
others initially stayed in the running. In the medium 
term, however, the new guidelines led to one pub-
lisher, Prosveshchenie (meaning enlightenment), 
receiving most of the state’s contracts. Other well-
established houses were rejected on spurious pretexts, 
such as failing to enter the subtitles of their textbooks 
in certain forms. Prosveshchenie has close ties to the 
Rotenberg brothers, who in turn have cultivated a 
close relationship with Putin for years.92 Thus, the 
Kremlin-connected owners of the publishing house 
profit, and central government has more powerful 
leverage for controlling textbook content, for instance 
to ensure that it is sufficiently “patriotic”.93 Education 
Minister Olga Vasilyeva, who has been in office since 
August 2016, is well-known for her desire to curtail 
plurality and impose a pro-regime emphasis in history 
lessons.94 
 
91 See e.g. Aleksandr Aseev, “Reforma RAN kak ugroza natsio-
nal’noj bezopasnosti” [The reform of the RAN (= Russian Acad-
emy of Sciences) as a threat to national security], Regnum (on-
line), 8 December 2015, https://regnum.ru/news/innovatio/ 
2029988.html (accessed 6 March 2017). 
92 Jo Becker and Steven Lee Myers, “Putin’s Friend Profits in 
Purge of Schoolbooks”, The New York Times, 1 November 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/02/world/europe/putins-
friend-profits-in-purge-of-schoolbooks.html?_r=0 (accessed 
6 March 2017). 
93 One popular maths textbook was categorised as unpatri-
otic because it used characters from foreign children’s books 
to explain mathematical contents, see ibidem. 
94 Eva Hartog, “God, Stalin and Patriotism – Meet Russia’s 
New Education Chief”, The Moscow Times, 24 August 2016, 
Health policy 
Trends in health policy resemble those in educational 
policy. Here, too, many institutions have been 
closed.95 For growing numbers of Russians – especially 
those living in the provinces, who already suffer from 
an infrastructure deficit (bad roads, no public 
transport) – this means no access to medical help. De 
facto, most medical care has to be paid for, even if it is 
supposedly free by law. A respected expert in regional 
development in Russia, Natalya Zubarevich, has 
stated: “What is taking place has nothing to do with 
the quality of health care. It’s tied exclusively with 
fiscal policies, with attempts at cutting costs. No 
matter what is being said, no matter what polished 
formulations are being used to say things will 
improve, these are only words. This is more than 
obvious”.96 In 2011 the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) and a series of partners had already found that 
access to medical care in Russia was marked by 
growing inequality.97 The government has reacted to 
indignant experts and affected citizens either 
disparagingly or else by ignoring them completely. 
Serious interventions in the health system are decided 
from one day to the next and follow no discernable 
logic. For instance, in 2014 plans were leaked to the 
press that 28 hospitals in Moscow would be closed the 
following year, although the medical community had 
been neither consulted nor informed.98 
As in education, high-ranking officials use the 
health sector as an opportunity to profit personally 
 
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/god-stalin-patriotism--
meet-russias-new-education-minister-55090 (accessed 6 March 
2017). 
95 From 2005 to 2013 the number of health centres in rural 
areas dropped by 75 percent: Nikolai Epple, “Russian Health 
Care is Dying a Slow Death”, The Moscow Times, 16 April 2015, 
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russian-health-care-is-
dying-a-slow-death-45839 (accessed 6 March 2017). 
96 Lyubov Chizhova et al., “Russian Medics Take on ‘Destruc-
tive’ Health-Care Reform”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (on-
line), 4 November 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-
health-care-reform/26674311.html (accessed 6 March 2017). 
97 Larisa Popovich et al., Russian Federation: Health System Review, 
Health Systems in Transition, vol. 13, no. 7 (Copenhagen: 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2011), 
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/157092/ 
HiT-Russia_EN_web-with-links.pdf (accessed 6 March 2017). 
98 Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Thousands of Hospital Staff to Be 
Sacked in Russian Healthcare Reforms”, The Independent, 28 
November 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ 
europe/thousands-of-hospital-staff-to-be-sacked-in-russian-
healthcare-reforms-9891710.html (accessed 6 March 2017). 
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from their posts or else to let friends and relatives 
benefit. A classic example is former health minister 
Tatyana Golikova, who was in office from 2007 to 
2012, and has, since 2013, led the Russian Court of 
Auditors. As a minister, she promoted medicines 
produced by pharmaceutical companies in which she 
had a direct or indirect interest. This especially con-
cerns the firm Pharmstandard, which sells Arbidol, 
among other medication.99 Pharmstandard’s revenues 
increased substantially, and Golikova was nicknamed 
“Madame Arbidol”100 – she had, inter alia, threatened 
to close pharmacies that did not stock the influenza 
medication.101 Putin even supported the advertising 
campaign in front of rolling cameras by asking for the 
price of Arbidol in a Murmansk pharmacy and being 
told that it was not at all expensive.102 
There is a vast disparity between the rhetoric of the 
Russian elite’s top echelons on health and education, 
and the actual actions of the state in these areas. Both 
the money approved for developing public services 
and the implementation of announced measures fall 
far short of the pledges. Corruption and disregard for 
the needs and expertise of those affected also reveal 
that decision-makers rank people’s needs and suffer-
ings as secondary or tertiary in importance, or even 
negligible. This has become particularly obvious 
during the past two years, when the Russian state has 
had less revenue and has been forced to make cuts. 
However, statistics clearly show that, even in better 
times, the elite recognised the challenges in health 
and educational policy,103 but was largely unwilling 
to tackle the problems with the appropriate resources. 
 
99 Roman Jakimenko, “Novyj ‘Arbidol’ Golikovoj” [Golikova’s 
new ‘Arbidol’], Kompromat.ru (online), 5 August 2011, http:// 
www.compromat.ru/page_31119.htm (accessed 6 March 2017). 
100 “‘Madam Arbidol’ ministr Tat’jana Golikova ‘ubila’ zdra-
vochranenie i ee otstavka neizbezhna?“ [Has ‘Madame Arbi-
dol’, the Minister Tatyana Golikova, ‘killed off’ the health sys-
tem, and is her resignation now unavoidable?], Corrupcia.net 
(online), 17 December 2010, https://www.corrupcia.net/talks/ 
talk-266.html (accessed 6 March 2017). 
101 Wikileaks, “[OS] Russia – Russian Paper Offers Rating of 
‘Most Corrupt Ministries’”, The Global Intelligence Files (online), 
21 September 2011, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/21/ 
2186612_-os-russia-russian-paper-offers-rating-of-most-
corrupt.html (accessed 6 March 2017). 
102 Gregory Warner, “The Making of a Russian Blockbuster 
Drug”, Marketplace (online), 23 February 2011, http://www. 
marketplace.org/2011/02/23/world/making-russian-
blockbuster-drug (accessed 6 March 2017). 
103 Vladimir Putin, “Building Justice: A Social Policy for 
Russia”, RT (online), 13 February 2012, https://www.rt.com/ 
politics/official-word/putin-building-justice-russia-133/ 
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Attitudes to Violence and the Significance of Human Life 
 
Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the war that it 
provoked in the Donbas have shown that it is prepared 
to go further in its use of military force than most West-
ern observers had assumed. Its intervention in Syria 
also came as a surprise to many politicians and com-
mentators in the West. These actions raise the follow-
ing questions: what is the significance of the military 
component in Russia’s foreign-policy arsenal, and 
what does the elite fundamentally think of violence 
as a means of enforcing political interests? In which 
cases does it consider the use of violence to be legiti-
mate, and for which purposes is violence employed? 
What value does it ascribe to human life in general? 
These questions are relevant not only for Russia’s for-
eign policy, but – whenever the violence of the state 
is directed at its own people – also for its domestic 
politics. 
For the purposes of this analysis, violence is defined 
as “targeted direct physical damage of people by 
people”.104 In foreign policy, this mainly concerns the 
use or threat of military violence. Within Russia, this 
study will look not only at cases of state violence, but 
also at links between high-ranking members of the 
elite and organised crime, as well as the way state 
actors have militarised the discourse. 
Violence in Foreign Policy 
Russia deployed its own armed and security forces 
to occupy and annex the Crimea. Initially, this was 
denied and concealed; however, Putin later publicly 
admitted it (see above, p. 16). Since the Ukrainian 
troops did not offer any resistance, the takeover of the 
peninsula was largely carried out without violence. 
However, the vote on deposing the Crimean govern-
ment and the referendum on the future of the pen-
 
104 Gertrud Nunner-Winkler, “Überlegungen zum Gewalt-
begriff”, in Gewalt: Entwicklungen, Strukturen, Analyseprobleme, 
ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer and Hans-Georg Soeffner (Frankfurt, 
2004), 21–61 (21). I could have chosen a much broader defi-
nition, but that would go beyond the scope of this study. 
However, an analysis of attitudes to violence in Russia in 
the wider sense – including on the societal level – would 
be extremely worthwhile. 
insula were conducted in the presence of armed Rus-
sian special forces (spetsnaz).105 Due to intense intimi-
dation, numerous opponents of the Russian annexa-
tion stayed away from the referendum altogether.106 
Putin later claimed that he had been ready to put 
Russia’s nuclear armed forces on alert to defend the 
Crimea if Western countries had intervened militari-
ly.107 Whether or not this claim is exaggerated, it is 
an indication of the Russian leadership’s irresponsible 
approach to the topic of nuclear weapons. 
In the Donbas, Russia’s willingness to incite the use 
of violence by other actors and to use violence itself is 
clearer still. It is possible to piece together from various 
sources a convincing picture of what occurred a few 
days after the then President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanu-
kovych, fled to Russia: the Russian elite was prompting 
Ukrainian rebels to violently occupy public buildings 
in various parts of East Ukraine and then ask Russia 
for assistance.108 In areas of the Donbas where this 
 
105 Oleg Karp’jak, “Chubarov: ‘God nazad my byli uvereny, 
chto spasli Krym” [Chubarov: ‘A year ago, we were convinced 
that we had saved the Crimea’], BBC (online), 26 February 
2015, http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/ukraine_in_russian/ 
2015/02/150226_ru_s_chubarov_crimea; Andrej Kondrashov, 
“Krym: Put’ na rodinu” [Crimea: The way home] (video), 2015, 
http://russia.tv/brand/show/brand_id/59195 (both accessed 
6 March 2017). 
106 Anastasija Kornja, Polina Temerina and Nikita Varenov, 
“Kak zhiteli Kryma golosovali za vchozhdenie v sostav Rossii” 
[How the inhabitants of the Crimea voted for incorporation 
into Russia], Vedomosti, 16 March 2014, http://www.vedomosti. 
ru/politics/articles/2014/03/16/kak-zhiteli-kryma-golosovali-za-
vhozhdenie-v-sostav-rossii; Adam Withnall, “Crimeans Over-
whelmingly Vote to Leave Ukraine and Join Russia in Conten-
tious Referendum”, The Independent, 16 March 2014, http:// 
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/crimea-
referendum-how-why-and-where-next-for-soon-to-be-divided-
ukraine-9195310.html (both accessed 6 March 2017). 
107 “Putin: ‘My byli gotovy’ primenit’ jadernoe oruzhie iz-za 
Kryma” [Putin: ‘We were ready’ to use nuclear weapons over 
the Crimea], BBC (online), 15 March 2015, http://www.bbc.com/ 
ukrainian/ukraine_in_russian/2015/03/150315_ru_s_putin_ 
documentary_crimea (accessed 6 March 2017). 
108 Tat’jana Zarovnaja, “‘Turisty’ iz Rossii pribyvajut v 
Donetsk avtobusami” [‘Tourists’ from Russia come to Donetsk 
by the busload], Gazeta.ua (online), 13 March 2014, http:// 
gazeta.ua/ru/articles/politics/_turisty-iz-rossii-pribyvayut-v-
doneck-avtobusami/547034; “V Ukraine raskryli gromkij 
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form of takeover – or rather elimination – of state 
institutions was successful, Russia gradually extended 
its intervention by providing weapons and war ma-
terials, instructors and, especially in critical moments, 
soldiers as well.109 Moscow also ordered a substantial 
concentration of troops on the Russian-Ukrainian 
border to make the military threat abundantly clear.110 
A number of plausible analyses have come to the con-
clusion that, without this Russian support, the Ukrain-
ian armed and security forces would have succeeded 
in getting the rebellion in the east of the country 
under control as early as the summer of 2014.111 
To the surprise of many observers, Russia has 
shown itself equally prepared to intervene in Syria 
with a substantial military deployment. However, 
there is a broad consensus among experts on how to 
interpret Moscow’s goals in Syria. For them, Russia 
wants to end the international isolation that followed 
its actions in Ukraine; to force the US to engage in 
negotiations on an equal footing; to secure its influ-
ence in Syria and the Middle East as a whole; and to 
defend the principle of “no regime change from the 
outside”. Domestically, the intervention buoys the 
leadership by convincing the Russian people that their 
country occupies a powerful position on the inter-
national stage. Helping to solve the conflict, however, 
does not feature as a Russian aim in the vast majority 
of expert analyses, or plays only a minor role.112 
 
kompromat na sovetnika Putina: pojavilos’ audio” [Com-
promising material on Putin advisor discovered in Ukraine: 
an audiotape emerges], Online.ua, 22 August 2016, http:// 
news.online.ua/750979/v-ukraine-raskryli-gromkiy-
kompromat-na-sovetnika-putina-poyavilis-audio/ (both 
accessed 6 March 2017). 
109 Putin. War, ed. Yashin and Shorina (see note 14), chapter 
4; Miller et al., An Invasion by Any Other Name (see note 14). 
110 See e.g. Czuperski et al., Hiding in Plain Sight (see note 14). 
111 “Reversal of Fortune”, The Economist, 6 September 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21615605-now-
willing-use-russian-troops-more-or-less-openly-eastern-ukraine-
vladimir-putin-has; Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the 
Art of Limited War”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 56 
(1 December 2014) 6, https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/ 
survival/sections/2014-4667/survival--global-politics-and-
strategy-december-2014-january-2015-bf83/56-6-02-freedman-
6983 (both accessed 6 March 2017). 
112 See e.g. Margarete Klein, “Russia’s Syria Intervention: 
Interests, Achievements and Obstacles”, in Russia in the Middle 
East: Israeli and European Perspectives (Tel Aviv, 2016), 12–16, 
http://s3-eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/fes-org-il-wp/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/26224502/Russia-in-the-Middle-East-
English.pdf; Stefan Meister, “Neue Unberechenbarkeit. Putin 
verfolgt in Syrien eigene Ziele, Teil einer Lösung ist der Kreml 
nicht”, Internationale Politik 70, no. 6 (November/December 
Observers have not only questioned Russia’s use of 
violence in Syria per se, but also the form and goals 
of its military action. The groups and territories that 
Russia has attacked not do fit the Kremlin rhetoric of 
fighting the so-called “Islamic State”. However, even 
more relevant for the purposes of the present analysis 
is the behaviour of the Russian military towards civil-
ians and civilian institutions, such as schools and 
hospitals. According to Amnesty International and 
Médecins sans Frontières, Russian fighter jets have 
deliberately targeted such institutions and have not 
spared civilians during their attacks in general.113 
They have also dropped cluster bombs, which repre-
sent an additional threat to civilians and which most 
countries would like to see banned.114 This points to 
low levels of respect for human life and to a readiness 
to accept civilian casualties in trying to realise foreign-
policy goals. Moscow has refused to take responsibility 
for the death of thousands of civilians and also denies 
the use of cluster bombs.115 Russia has had to face 
well-founded accusations of war crimes, in particular 
with reference to its role in the attacks on Aleppo in 
autumn 2016; this has led to calls from the interna-
tional community for further sanctions against 
Russia.116 
 
2015 [1 November 2015]): 66–69, https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap. 
org/de/ip-die-zeitschrift/archiv/jahrgang-2015/november-
dezember/neue-unberechenbarkeit (both accessed 13 March 
2017). 
113 “Russia’s Shameful Failure to Acknowledge Civilian 
Killings“, Amnesty International (online), 23 December 2015, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/12/syria-russias-
shameful-failure-to-acknowledge-civilian-killings/; Kareem 
Shaheen, “MSF Stops Sharing Syria Hospital Locations after 
‘Deliberate Attacks’”, The Guardian, 18 February 2016, http:// 
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/18/msf-will-not-share-
syria-gps-locations-after-deliberate-attacks (both accessed 6 
March 2017). 
114 Russia, however, has not signed or ratified the relevant 
agreement. 
115 Jack Sommers, “Russian Military ‘Killed No Civilians in 
Syria’, Ambassador Alexander Yakovenko Says”, The Huffington 
Post, 15 March 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/ 
russian-bombing-syria-no-civilian-casualties_uk_56e86428e4b 
05c52666f4c1b; “Campaigners Blame Russia over Cluster 
Bomb Use in Syria”, The Daily Mail (online), 1 September 2016, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3768566/Cluster-
bombs-killed-maimed-400-2015-report-says.html (both ac-
cessed 6 March 2017). 
116 “Russia/Syria: War Crimes in Month of Bombing Aleppo”, 
Human Rights Watch (online), 1 December 2016, http://www. 
hrw.org/news/2016/12/01/russia/syria-war-crimes-month-
bombing-aleppo (accessed 6 March 2017). 
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With the exception of Syria, in the past few years 
Russia has used military force exclusively in the post-
Soviet region. The main example is the war with Geor-
gia in August 2008. The so-called Tagliavini report, 
which was subsequently produced by an independent 
inquiry, concluded that Georgia had started the war 
by attacking the town of Tskhinvali. The attack had, 
however, been proceeded by acts of provocation by 
Moscow, such as the distribution of Russian passports 
to inhabitants of South Ossetia (part of Georgia) as 
well as military manoeuvres and troop concentrations 
on the Russian side of the border.117 These measures 
were well-planned: immediately after the fighting, 
Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as in-
dependent and significantly expanded its military 
bases in both territories. 
Russia has also increased its military presence in 
Armenia. In 2010 Moscow signed a treaty with the gov-
ernment in Yerevan that allows increased numbers of 
Russian troops to stay in Armenia until 2044. Russia 
also has army units stationed in Transnistria. The 
Belarusian defence sector is largely integrated with 
Russia’s. In Central Asia, Russia has several bases in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Furthermore, 
there are numerous indicators showing that its mili-
tary capacities in the Crimea are being substantially 
replenished and expanded.118 
The presence of these bases and the above-mentioned 
developments do not necessarily mean that the Rus-
sian military will actually be sent into battle in these 
countries. It does demonstrate, however, that the Krem-
lin views military might as an integral policy instru-
ment for the post-Soviet area. Even if these military 
capacities are not put to use, the threat alone may suf-
fice to make the host countries act in ways that are 
agreeable to Russia. Meanwhile the events in Georgia 
and Ukraine have shown that Moscow is prepared to 
follow through on its threats.119 
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The Use of Violence within Russia 
Domestically, the Russian Federation’s security and 
law-enforcement agencies do not resort to direct 
(physical) violence against the Russian people on a 
grand scale. The wars in Chechnya fall outside of the 
period covered by this study. However, violence con-
tinues to be the predominant means of controlling 
the situation in the North Causasus. A group of experts 
concluded in spring 2016 that “the region remains 
heavily militarized and Russia’s policy retains a strong 
security focus”.120 And in individual cases, violence is 
deliberately used against citizens – be they demonstra-
tors, opposition politicians or unpopular journalists. 
Moreover, many crimes for which a political motiva-
tion seems plausible are never solved – or only par-
tially. This feeds the suspicion that the state is directly 
or indirectly responsible, especially since the relevant 
authorities’ attempts at explanation are often feeble. 
A specific form of violence, which does not directly 
emanate from the state, but must be imputed to it, is 
that used by organised crime gangs which enjoy the 
protection of federal authorities.121 A multi-year re-
search project on the ties between elites and organised 
crime describes it as a characteristic trait of organised 
crime gangs that their “existence is maintained using 
violence and threats”.122 In other words, collaboration 
between the authorities and members of organised 
crime gangs can be a way of getting non-state actors to 
use violence in the interest of state actors. Its starting-
point is an implicit endorsement of such methods by 
the state actors involved. 
The ties between organised crime and the Russian 
state have been well-researched, and no longer only 
for the 1990s. In 2015 Maria Snegovaya from New 
York’s Columbia University concluded that “Russia is 
less an autocracy and more a mafia state”. She refers, 
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inter alia, to statements by Spain’s Special Prosecutor 
for Corruption and Organised Crime, José Grinda, who 
has investigated Russian mafia gangs in Spain and is 
convinced that in the Russian case “one cannot dif-
ferentiate between the activities of the government 
and organized crime groups.”123 Karen Dawisha from 
Miami University in Ohio also cites Grinda’s findings 
in her painstakingly researched book. According to 
her, there was evidence for very close links between 
the bosses of the notorious Tambov-Malyshev Gang 
(Gennady Petrov and Aleksandr Malyshev) and a series 
of high-ranking Russian politicians, such as the former 
defence minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and the former 
communication minister Leonid Reiman.124 The Rus-
sian opposition leader Alexei Navalny has uncovered a 
similar web of contacts between the son of the Russian 
Attorney-General, Artem Chaika, and another boss, 
Sergei Tsapok.125 Tsapok was responsible for a series of 
horrifying murders in the Krasnodar region and was 
finally caught. He died in prison in July 2014. 
The growing influence of military and security 
actors (the so-called siloviki) under Putin’s rule can also 
be seen as an indication that the regime’s tendency to 
“solve” problems using violence has increased. After 
all, the use of physical violence is a genuine part of 
their repertoire of actions, which, as a rule, is not the 
case for civilian members of the elite. One example is 
Viktor Zolotov, who was appointed by Putin to be the 
leader of the newly created National Guard and a mem-
ber of the Security Council in April 2016. In August 
2000 Zolotov was head of the presidential guard and, 
in this capacity, travelled to New York to prepare 
Putin’s speech at the United Nations, where he talked 
to the director of the Federal Protective Service (FSO), 
Evgeny Murov. The two security men reflected on 
who would have to be eliminated to secure unlimited 
power for Putin. After drawing up a list of names, 
Zolotov remarked: “There are too many. Even for us 
that’s too many to kill.”126 
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A further indicator of the significance of violence is 
the increasing militarisation of political and societal 
discourse, which has been partly initiated and orches-
trated by the elite. The December 2014 military doc-
trine states that measures need to be developed and 
implemented which “aim to strengthen the effective-
ness of the military-patriotic training of Russian 
citizens and their preparedness for military service”. 
This approach has been expanded in the state pro-
gramme “Military-patriotic education for the citizens 
of the Russian Federation from 2016 to 2020”. The 
programme is the fourth of its kind since 2001. Three 
ministries (education, defence, culture) share the 
main responsibility for its implementation with the 
federal agency for youth affairs.127 DOSAAF,128 which 
has been tasked alongside others with realising the 
concept, has been given an additional five billion 
roubles since 2010, bringing the total to 14.7 billion 
roubles (by the end of 2014).129 Headed by a colonel-
general, DOSAAF is involved inter alia in an initiative 
by the defence ministry that effectively revives an 
organisation of the Soviet era, known as Yunarmiya 
(Young Army). It provides youths between the ages of 
14 and 18 with paramilitary training and familiarises 
them with Russia’s military history.130 After a pilot 
phase from May 2016, the Yunarmiya movement was 
officially and ceremonially founded by Defence Minis-
ter Shoigu in August of that year. Shoigu pointed out 
that the movement already had branches in 76 Rus-
sian regions.131 
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The Russian political scientist Lilia Shevtsova argues 
that this militarisation from the top down is nothing 
new; similar campaigns have been started time and 
again throughout Russia’s past with the purpose of 
cementing the state’s legitimacy: “In the Russian case, 
the primacy of the state has been legitimized with 
reference to real or (more often) imagined threats, 
both internal and external. Those threats had to be 
severe enough to justify the militarization of everyday 
life in Russia and the subjugation of the very founda-
tions of society to militarist goals. In short, Russia 
developed a unique model for the survival and repro-
duction of power in a permanent state of war. This 
situation was maintained even in peacetime, which 
has always been temporary in Russia. The country is 
constantly either preparing for war against an exter-
nal enemy or pursuing enemies at home. Russia has 
survived by annihilating the boundary between war 
and peace; its state simply could not exist in a peace-
ful environment.”132 
These initiatives to increase the militarisation of 
society thus fit into a more far-reaching regime strat-
egy to guarantee its own survival, inter alia by inflating 
dangers that make the use of violence seem ever more 
necessary. Violence is exalted as a means of defending 
the homeland and one’s traditions, and following the 
elite’s example, large parts of society are becoming 
increasingly used to connotating violence relatively 
positively because it is “patriotic”. 
To sum up, in its foreign policy, Russia relies on the 
threat and use of military violence as an instrument 
for realising its goals. This is true particularly for the 
post-Soviet region, though not exclusively, as Mos-
cow’s intervention in Syria has shown. In other words, 
violence is not seen as something best avoided, but as 
a suitable means of securing one’s own position. With-
in Russia, other forms of state repression occur more 
often than physical violence. Nevertheless, it is still 
selectively used, and there are mechanisms and net-
works in place that make its wider application pos-
sible without a hindrance, if this should be seen as 
opportune. Moreover, there is a tendency towards glo-
rifying violence, which goes hand in hand with the 
increasing militarisation of Russian society and a cer-
tain historical narrative (see the section on approaches 
to truth and history, pp. 16ff.). All of these points to 
the conclusion that the Russian elite has a pragmatic 
 
132 Lilia Shevtsova, “What’s the Matter with Russia?”, Journal 
of Democracy 21, no. 1 (January 2010): 152–59, https://muse. 
jhu.edu/article/370471/summary (accessed 6 March 2017). 
attitude to violence: it is simply an instrument which 
can usefully be deployed for purposes of control and 
mobilisation. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Since 2014 the Russian leadership’s actions have shown 
the world that it is prepared to violate international 
law, use military violence for a variety of purposes with-
out consideration for civilian losses, and build edifices 
of lies and doggedly maintain them, even if the state-
ments have already been exposed as false. It has also 
demonstrated that it wants to convince its own citizens 
to uncomplainingly exchange their expectations of 
ever-increasing prosperity for pride in the international 
influence that their homeland has regained. 
These tendencies are no longer recent, though they 
did take many observers by surprise when they mani-
fested themselves in a particularly intense and con-
centrated form three years ago. It has been the aim 
of this study to infer the Russian elite’s fundamental 
attitudes from Russia’s recent actions, and to show 
that, even before 2014, there were clear indications 
of the existence of such attitudes. This continuity sug-
gests that these attitudes are an expression of the Rus-
sian elite’s political culture, which will extend beyond 
the current crisis in relations between Russia and the 
West.133 Since the attitudes described above have be-
come more pronounced in the last two to three years, 
there could presumably also be periods in which they 
are less evident. However, current developments in Rus-
sia indicate that they are likely to become even more 
prominent in the near future. Either way, Germany 
and the EU will be confronted with them in the years 
to come, be it in their weaker or stronger incarnation. 
The behaviour of the Russian elite in the various 
areas analysed by this study shows that maintaining 
control of the situation – whether in international 
relations or in the domestic Russian context – is fun-
damentally important. In the elite’s eyes, the primacy 
of this concern may under certain circumstances jus-
tify non-compliance with an agreement, the manipu-
lation of information, or the use of coercion or vio-
lence. This need for control stems from the elite’s deep 
mistrust of the Russian citizenry, its international 
partners and its own supporters. This mistrust pre-
 
133 Ulrich Schmid comes to a similar conclusion in stating 
that “the political culture of Russia has not fundamentally 
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russischen Gegenwartskultur (Berlin, 2015), 10. 
vents a constructive programme from being developed 
and leads Russia to concentrate mainly on a negative 
agenda designed to inflict damage on others. 
The Russian elite is prepared to use any means to 
retain or gain control. Its relationship with the areas 
analysed is therefore an instrumental one: laws and 
violence can be employed if they make it easier to 
dominate a given situation. History and the truth can 
be manipulated and distorted if that allows a 
narrative to be created which can decisively influence 
the opinion of the Russian people or relevant groups 
abroad. Finally, the public welfare can be sacrificed 
if resources are needed to keep sections of the elite 
under control. This purpose-oriented approach to the 
spheres examined – law, truth, public welfare and vio-
lence – suggests that the Russian elite’s behaviour in 
other spheres of political and social life (e.g. religion) 
is not based on ethical or ideological principles either, 
but rather focuses on securing and expanding power. 
This analysis has shown that it is not impossible to 
successfully negotiate bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments with Russia. However, three points should be 
remembered. First, be prepared for long negotiations – 
not only because of the difference in attitudes on the 
two sides, but also because the process may be just as 
important for Russia as the result, since negotiations 
confer status. Second, there is at best a small chance of 
success with accords concerning the post-Soviet region 
or Russia’s internal development (such as the Minsk 
agreements regarding Eastern Ukraine). Third, Russia 
may choose to violate the agreement at some later point. 
Any accord should therefore contain clearly phrased 
clauses detailing the negative consequences in case of 
non-compliance. If a decision is taken not to establish 
such consequences – for example, in order to facilitate 
the negotiating process – this should be done in the 
knowledge that it makes infringements more likely. 
Given the disparity between the fundamental atti-
tudes of many Western and Russian actors, discussions 
should start at a basic level. It should not be assumed 
that the two sides interpret essential concepts, the pro-
cess or the goals of talks in the same manner. This 
means investing much time in creating a common base 
for any round of dialogues or negotiations. In every 
phase, the results of the discussions should be written 
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down and signed by both sides, unless preliminary talks 
are agreed upon in which all parties consent to forgo 
any written record of the event. Moreover, for the fore-
seeable future, only limited and straightforward mat-
ters should be negotiated with Russia. The differences 
between the underlying approaches are too great for 
substantial joint undertakings to be negotiated, let 
alone implemented, in the short or medium term. 
Small rounds on micro topics seem more promising: 
here, it should be easier to agree on terms, procedures 
and goals, and establish sustainable cooperation. For 
instance, an exchange on fundamental legal issues be-
tween Russian lawyers and their colleagues from vari-
ous EU member states could be a possibility for airing 
the discrepancies in basic attitudes described above. 
In negotiations and official dialogue formats (as 
well as informal talks) with Russia, enough time will 
need to be set aside to verify the theses Moscow uses as 
a starting-point. Since Russian dialogue partners are 
willing to distort or even disregard the truth for their 
purposes, all dubious claims should be both directly 
challenged and verified later. If necessary, small sub-
groups could be formed in which representatives from 
both sides present and discuss evidence for their re-
spective way of thinking. This will be particularly 
important when historical issues are to be addressed. 
There will presumably be much mistrust on the Rus-
sian side as well. The subgroups could thus help to 
improve mutual comprehension of the various argu-
ments (or lack thereof), even if no consensus is ulti-
mately reached. 
Agreements ostensibly intended to improve aspects 
of public welfare in Russia are primarily used by the 
Russian side for other objectives, for instance to ben-
efit small sections of the elite. It is unlikely that those 
involved on the Russian side will strive to include suit-
able experts or civil-society representatives in official 
talks or preliminary discussions, or welcome them if 
they are. Rather, all negotiations and all the outcomes 
targeted by Russia will be based on a top-down ap-
proach that neglects social priorities. Taking this into 
account, including political actors in formats such as 
the Petersburg Dialogue (between Russia and Germa-
ny) is of questionable value. However, both institu-
tionalised and informal contacts between civil-society 
representatives in Russia and the EU member states 
continue to be meaningful and should be cultivat-
ed.134 
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Finally, it should be assumed that Moscow is fun-
damentally prepared to use physical violence to realise 
the Russian leadership’s goals. Since Russia has in-
vested substantially more resources in building up its 
military capacities in the past few years than in other 
areas, we should expect the Russian elite to keep 
resorting to military violence as a suitable means of 
furthering its interests. This is likely above all in the 
post-Soviet region, but could also occur beyond it, as 
the Syrian case has demonstrated. 
The EU should use the current phase, in which only 
limited dialogue with Moscow is possible, to discuss 
internally the contours of its future approach towards 
Russia. It needs to define its medium to long-term goals 
for its relationship with Russia and other post-Soviet 
states; in this, it should aim to go beyond the concepts 
already outlined in the revised format of the Eastern 
Partnership. To formulate these aims realistically, it 
may be helpful to take into account the fundamental 
attitudes of the top echelons of Russia’s elite, as de-
scribed above, because they will shape the behaviour 
of that elite in the coming years. It will be just as cru-
cial to draw red lines that make the limits of the EU 
approach absolutely clear. These red lines could at the 
same time serve the EU as guide rails that demarcate 
the area within which future agreements with Russia 
are acceptable to Brussels. 
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